What is the impact of prisoner exchange negotiations in Muscat on the peace process?
| Executive Summary: Recent negotiations for a prisoner exchange concluded in Muscat, the capital of Oman, on Saturday, July 6, 2024. The parties involved were the internationally recognized government and the Ansar Allah group (the Houthis) under the supervision of the United Nations (UN). The prisoner exchange process is viewed as a crucial element in the UN’s approach to ending the war and a significant step towards achieving peace. It serves as a necessary foundation for fostering trust between the conflicting parties in Yemen and creates an opportunity for subsequent political consultations. These negotiations were driven by the shared desire of Saudi Arabia and the Ansar Allah group to bring an end to the decade-long conflict in Yemen. However, this desire appears to be lacking among the internationally recognized government and other opposing factions towards the Ansar Allah group. Consequently, the potential impact of these negotiations on future peace prospects is significantly diminished. |
Introduction:
For over nine years, Yemen has been enduring a devastating war between the internationally recognized government (IRG), backed by Saudi Arabia, and the Ansar Allah group. This war has led to one of the world’s worst humanitarian and economic crises. Among the pressing issues is the matter of prisoners of war and the missing, whose exact numbers remain uncertain. However, during the Sweden consultations in 2018, Ansar Allah group and the internationally recognized government provided lists indicating the presence of at least 15,000 prisoners, detainees, and abductees held by the warring parties in Yemen.
The issue of prisoners and detainees in Yemen has been a significant humanitarian concern that has garnered attention from UN envoys and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Various efforts have been made to address this issue, resulting in the release of a number of detainees. For example, in October 2020, a significant prisoner exchange operation took place between the internationally recognized government and the Ansar Allah group, leading to the release of over 1,050 prisoners from both sides. In March 2022, the conflict parties signed an agreement, supported by the international community, with the aim of exchanging over 2,200 prisoners. However, the release process encountered obstacles as mutual accusations hindered progress. Another substantial prisoner exchange operation occurred in mid-April of last year (2023) during negotiations held in Geneva, Switzerland. The conflict parties reached an agreement to exchange 887 detainees, including 706 from Ansar Allah group, 181 prisoners from the IRG, as well as Saudi and Sudanese captives. More recently, in June 2024, new negotiations for a prisoner exchange commenced in Muscat, Oman, under the supervision of the United Nations. These negotiations concluded on July 6, 2024, and according to statements from the UN envoy, they resulted in significant progress. The parties reached an understanding to release prominent Yemeni politician Mohammed Qahtan, resolving a longstanding dispute. Additionally, they agreed to hold a follow-up meeting in two months to finalize the agreement regarding the names of detainees to be released and the arrangements for Qahtan’s release.
However, it is important to note that the outcomes of these negotiations have yet to materialize. While the potential exchange of prisoners and the release of Mohammed Qahtan are viewed as positive developments, some consider them to be a step in the right direction towards a definitive resolution of the conflict and a precursor to achieving peace.
This analysis seeks to address the following question: Does progress in the prisoner exchange necessarily indicate a path towards ending the war and achieving peace? To understand this relationship, we will discuss the political will of the conflict parties and the level of trust between them. But before that, it is important to acknowledge the role played by Oman in hosting these negotiations.
Qualities of the Omani Mediator
The Sultanate of Oman possesses the ideal qualities to serve as a mediator between the Ansar Allah group and the international community, regional actors, and the internationally recognized government. Since the beginning of the war, Oman has maintained its declared neutrality in regional crises by abstaining from joining the Saudi-led coalition. Additionally, Muscat maintains favorable relations with various parties involved in the local conflict and their external supporters.
Since the outbreak of the Yemeni military conflict in March 2015, Oman has refrained from direct involvement and has strived to maintain an impartial stance between the warring parties. Despite some dissatisfaction expressed by certain members of the IRG regarding Oman’s perceived sympathy towards the Ansar Allah group on specific contentious issues, Oman has achieved relative success in its mediation efforts.
As one of the most influential regional actors, and possibly even globally, Oman is capable of playing a constructive role in resolving the Yemeni conflict. It has previously facilitated multiple rounds of negotiations between the conflicting parties as part of regional and international endeavors to achieve a political solution and end the war. Notably, Oman preferred to carry out those mediation efforts quietly, without making official statements. However, since 2003, Muscat has become a major hub for regional, international, American, and United Nations diplomatic activities related to the Yemeni conflict. It has hosted numerous rounds of talks between the internationally recognized government, regional actors, and the Ansar Allah group, among others. Recently, Oman’s efforts led to the development of the “Roadmap for Peace,” which was announced by the UN envoy at the end of last year (2023). Although these efforts came close to being signed, the process was hindered by the escalation of the military situation in Gaza and subsequent attacks by the Ansar Allah group on Israeli vessels or those associated with Israel.
Peace Roadmap
A draft of the roadmap was crystallized after approximately seven months of public discussions between the Ansar Allah group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, mediated by Oman. It was announced by the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, at the end of 2023. Some of its provisions leaked, outlining three main stages as follows:
The first stage relates to the humanitarian file and building trust, including the commitment of parties to implement a nationwide ceasefire and cease cross-border attacks, reopening roads in Taiz and other parts of Yemen, completing the process of prisoner exchange, and further easing restrictions on Sana’a airport and Hodeidah port. The second stage focuses on the economic aspect and the reunification of the banking system and currency, as well as the payment of salaries from resumed oil revenues. The third stage entails launching a comprehensive Yemeni political process under the UN supervision and the participation of all parties. Here, we question: Is it necessary for the breakthrough in the prisoner file to lead to a comprehensive political process? To answer this question, we need to understand the political will of the conflict parties.
Do the parties involved genuinely intend to achieve sustainable and lasting peace?
Negotiations over the prisoners and detainees file took place under the Saudi and the Ansar Allah group desire to end the ongoing conflict in Yemen for the past 10 years. As for Saudi Arabia, it seeks to resolve its issues with regional neighbors, including the Yemeni file. Saudi Arabia’s security concerns regarding the Ansar Allah group have diminished through bilateral understandings and regional guarantees. In this context, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan, expressed Saudi Arabia’s hope “to sign the road map as soon as possible”, stating in a press conference on 5 July 2024 that “The Yemeni roadmap is ready, and we are prepared to proceed accordingly.’ This statement indicates that Saudi Arabia is no longer willing to return to military confrontations and is looking for a way out.
In contrast to Saudi Arabia’s desire to extricate itself from the Yemeni file at any cost, the Ansar Allah group seeks to end the war with political and economic gains. This became evident through the threatening tone adopted by the leader of the Ansar Allah group, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia while the prisoner negotiations were in progress. He threatened to target its airports and banks in response to decision made by the Saudi-backed IRG to relocate banks from areas under the Ansar Allah group control to areas under the IRG.
Perhaps the Muscat negotiations did not address economic and financial issues, including the matter of banks, which led the Ansar Allah group to escalate its rhetoric towards Riyadh. Hence, it can be said that the prisoner negotiations are not necessarily a precursor to ending the war, as that remains subject to several political and economic variables.
The Ansar Allah group has repeatedly emphasized its demands to end the war on various occasions. These demands include a complete withdrawal of all coalition forces from the entire territory of the Yemeni Republic, its islands, and ports, shortly after reaching a comprehensive ceasefire. They also demand lifting the air, land, and sea blockade, compensating all war victims, reconstructing and rehabilitating all damaged buildings due to the fighting. Moreover, they insist that negotiations towards ending the war should take place with Saudi Arabia first, before engaging in Yemeni-Yemeni consultations. This has indeed been realized through what is known as the roadmap for peace.
The Ansar Allah group has refused to negotiate with the IRG about ending the war, as it views it as an illegitimate government, insisting that negotiation should be with Saudi Arabia. Once a deal is reached with Saudi Arabia to end the war, then negotiation with the IRG over the political future of Yemen could be possible.
The Ansar Allah group has consistently attributed all the consequences of the war, specifically the Saudi-led coalition’s actions, to aggression against their land and an unjust, unwarranted, and disproportionate war. From this perspective, they position themselves as victims, and the coalition as the aggressor. Therefore, it is not logical, from Ansar Allah’s point of view, to demand concessions from the victim; instead, the aggressor should make concessions. This is the basis of the political discourse of the Ansar Allah group regarding efforts to end the war and build peace. This discourse has now become logical and potentially acceptable.
The Ansar Allah group demonstrated resilience against intense airstrikes and engaged in negotiations with the IRG during its most vulnerable periods. Despite these challenges, they successfully influenced the direction of the negotiations in their favor. Presently, the Ansar Allah group has undergone significant transformations compared to previous years. They have gained confidence in their capabilities, developed a deeper understanding of their adversaries’ strengths and vulnerabilities, and acquired advanced military technology that has contributed to the enhancement of their missile and drone capabilities.
The Ansar Allah group recognizes the importance of engaging with international efforts, as it provides them with an international platform and forum to convey their views and present their demands to the world. It also offers them a platform to exert pressure on their main adversaries. Therefore, they will continue to participate.
Currently, all that the Ansar Allah group seeks is to neutralize Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the conflict in Yemen and leave the IRG without military, political and economic cover. Thus, it can be said that the Ansar Allah group is keen on ending the war with Saudi Arabia but is not concerned about engaging in a political partnership with the IRG, especially considering the political and military implications that may not be in their favor. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Ansar Allah group will give up the political and military gains it has achieved during years of conflict and share those gains with the IRG, which they consider a “mercenary” government that handed over the country and its people to an external aggressor who did not hesitate to destroy Yemen and kill its people.
As for the internationally recognized government, it insists on basing any dialogue on the three references: the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, especially Resolution 2216, which calls for the withdrawal of the Ansar Allah group from the areas they have seized, including Sana’a, and the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism, which include a smooth and peaceful transition of power.
Theoretically, the Yemeni government is still clinging to these conditions, but Saudi Arabia and the international community seem convinced to bypass these prerequisites, putting real pressure on the IRG to accept a deal it is not convinced of. This became evident from the confusion of the Yemeni government regarding its position on the latest round of prisoner exchange negotiations in Muscat, as it announced its intention not to participate a few days before they start, but quickly changed its position, seemingly under pressure from Riyadh. That is to say, if the IRG is forced to engage in negotiations it is not convinced of and does not believe in their outcomes, it will not pave the way for a genuine peace in Yemen.
As for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which opposes both the IRG and the Ansar Allah group, it sees the separation of southern Yemen from the north as its primary goal. Any negotiations outside this framework will be considered unacceptable, and thus the latest prisoner exchange negotiations in Muscat between the Ansar Allah group and the IRG are seen as meaningless. Therefore, there will be no solutions or peace unless the issue of the southern people is present in all stages of negotiation, according to a STC’s statement.
In the same vain, the same applies to the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah Party), whose leader, Mohammed Al-Yadumi, expressed his concerns about secret understandings between Saudi Arabia and the Ansar Allah group that do not consider the interests of the party. This led him to question the legitimacy of the government’s representation in the latest prisoner exchange negotiations in Muscat, accusing the IRG delegation of mismanaging the negotiation process and relinquishing fundamental rights of prisoners and detainees. This reflects the preemptive concerns of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform that the round of negotiations on prisoners could lead to other agreements related to the peace process without taking their interests into account.
Concluding Note
The negotiations concerning prisoners and detainees were presented under a humanitarian framework. However, a thorough examination of the history of this issue, spanning several years, reveals that these negotiations cannot be detached from their political and economic dimensions. Nevertheless, despite these dimensions, they are in line with the roadmap introduced by the UN envoy at the conclusion of the previous year. Consequently, they can be viewed as a proactive effort to implement one of the provisions outlined in the roadmap. Therefore, it can be argued that the negotiations on prisoners and detainees represent a pivotal stride towards concluding the war between the Ansar Allah group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, it should be noted that they do not necessarily mean the end of the internal conflict, nor does it mean, of course, that sustainable peace is around the corner.
***
