Do Yemeni political parties still have a role in the upcoming peace process?
Executive Summary:
The partisan and political life has been affected by the war that Yemen has been witnessing for ten years, as some Yemeni parties have lost a large part of their structural and organizational capacity, others have fragmented and divided within themselves, and some have adopted the principle of neutrality and positioning in gray areas. However, despite all of this, most Yemeni parties have remained present in the Yemeni political scene through their presence in ministerial formations, whether in the government affiliated with the Ansar Allah group in Sana’a or the internationally recognized government in Aden (IRG). However, given the Yemeni political reality and the rush of political parties into internal and external alliances, they have become outside the circle of influential political action, and are unable to make decisions that meet the vision and aspirations of Yemeni society.
Introduction
Political parties exercise an important function in defending the nation’s gains and expressing its vision to decision-makers. With regard to the expected political settlement in Yemen, Yemenis hope that Yemeni political parties will bring their vision and aspirations to the UN-supervised negotiation. The participation of political parties in ending the conflict and building peace is one of the most important pillars for achieving it. In addition, their involvement in peace negotiations ensures their support for the outcomes of the negotiations, and thus their involvement in shaping the political future of Yemen represents the first step towards making sustainable peace.
In light of all the international and regional efforts and peace initiatives on offer, some may wonder about the role of Yemeni political parties in these initiatives, as their participation is considered one of the most important pillars for achieving peace and contributing to the formation of a sustainable post-conflict state. However, at the same time, these parties may play a negative role by fueling hostility and aligning themselves with external forces whose vision and interests differ from those of Yemeni society.
This paper is based on the idea that building sustainable peace in Yemen requires political parties to engage more effectively in political initiatives adopted by the United Nations, or any other peace initiatives. It aims to identify the reality of Yemeni political parties in light of the transformations witnessed during the ten years of this war, and to know the roles played by Yemeni political parties during the conflict period and what is expected of them to contribute to ending the conflict and establishing peace.
Current situation of Yemeni political parties
Since the Yemeni revolution (September 26, 1962) in northern Yemen, and the independence of the southern part of Yemen from the British occupation (November 30, 1967) until the early nineties, Yemen, in its northern and southern parts, only knew a one-party system, where the General People’s Congress (GPC) and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) dominated the “northern” and “southern” political scene, respectively.
The unification of the two parts of Yemen (North and South) in 1990 was a major turning point in Yemeni political life, as the unification constitution issued in 1991 provided a good space for party work, permitted the system of political pluralism, and the establishment of political parties, the number of which reached approximately 46 parties and political organizations. Among the most important of these active parties that appeared on the Yemeni scene, in addition to the two ruling parties (GPC and the YSP), are the Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party (Islah), the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization, the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Haq Party, and the Salafi Rashad Party.
This approach represented a first step towards political pluralism and peaceful access to power through the ballot box. However, as a growing democracy, these democratic principles remained merely a political decoration exploited by these parties and organizations as a bridge to reach power. In any case, the GPC remained the ruling party since its founding in 1082 until 2011. However, at some points it allied with the YSP or the Islah Party.
In February 2011, most of the active parties in Yemen joined what was known as the “Arab Spring” revolution, mobilizing their supporters to join youth demonstrations calling for the “overthrow of the regime.”
When the Ansar Allah (the Houthis) forces entered Sana’a on September 21, 2014, and the military conflict began between them and the Saudi-backed government of former President (Abdul Mansur Hadi), the political parties were fragmented and divided between opponents or supporters of the warring parties. Thus, they lost the gains they had achieved in previous stages. The GPC’s leadership, the ruling party at the time, disintegrated, and the Joint Meeting Parties, which represented an influential political bloc at the time, collapsed.
The General People’s Congress (Sana’a wing)
The GPC is the most effective and popular party in Yemen and has been the ruling party for nearly 30 years. When the Ansar Allah group entered Sana’a in 2014, the party, headed by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, announced its alliance with the Ansar Allah group, and in result, the party’s leadership was fragmented and divided even further.
This alliance put them between three options: either to remain allied with the Ansar Allah group (pro-Ansar Allah wing), or to disappear from political life entirely, or to flee Sana’a and join former President Hadi’s Riyadh-based wing.
Initially, most of the GPC leaders chose to remain within the pro-Ansar Allah’s wing, and together they were able to fill the government vacuum in Sana’s authority, where they established “the Supreme Political Council” in 2016, consisting of ten members, equally divided between them. Then “the joint Salvation Government” was formed on November 28 of the same year, where some ministries were allocated to the GPC. By virtue of the party’s alliance with the Ansar Allah group and its position in the Supreme Political Council and the Salvation Government, the GPC participated in the Geneva and the Kuwait negotiations (2015, 2016).
In December 2017, a dramatic shift occurred in the relationship between the GPC and the Ansar Allah group, as the then-president of the GPC (Ali Abdullah Saleh) announced an uprising against the Ansar Allah group, leading to armed confrontations that ended with Saleh’s killing. Again, this led to further fragmentation and division among the GPC’s members; many of its leaders left the capital, Sana’a, and joined the Riyadh wing, and they have constituted the largest percentage of the internationally recognized government. Others preferred to stay in Sana’a, allying with the Ansar Allah group to form the “Salvation Government”. They continued in their positions until they have been replaced by the “Government of Change and Construction”, which was announced 5 days ago (August 13, 2024). Ahmed Ghaleb Nasser Al-Rahwi, who is politically affiliated with the GPC, is designated as PM. However, despite the fact that these GPC-affiliated figures were/are members of the either Cabinets, they do not necessarily represent the GPC’s vision or its political orientations.
Anti-Ansar Allah Political Parties
The General People’s Congress (Riyadh’s wing)
As for the other side, the General People’s Congress is an essential part of the internationally recognized government (Riyadh – Aden) and it is represented by 5 ministerial portfolios out of a total of 24 ministries (20%). In addition, three GPC members have become part of the eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), constituting about 37% of its leadership.
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party (Islah)
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party is the most prominent active political force supporting the IRG. It has remained cohesive in its organizational entity and political position since the Ansar Allah group came to power. Its leadership and many of its bases have moved to governorates under the IRG’s authority, such as Marib and Taiz, or to countries outside the country, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
The Islah party participated directly in resisting the expansion of Ansar Allah group in the southern governorates. However, as soon as the Ansar Allah group left Aden, measures were launched against the Islah Party and its institutions. Some of its leaders were assassinated and its headquarters were stormed and vandalized. The IRG was forced to exclude a number of personalities- affiliated or identified with the Islah- from their positions in the government. Despite these moves, it has remained organizationally coherent and has remained a prominent partner in the successive internationally recognized governments.
The Islah party suffers the most as its leaders have remained in Riyadh. Like IRG, its political decision has become dependent on the Saudi position. It would even more become unable to express its political will in many situations. As it is part of IRG and some of its leaders are residing in Riyadh, the party has remained silent on many crucial issues that neither corresponded to its political vision nor to the interests of the Yemeni people. Yet, some of its members who reside in Yemen, Turkey or elsewhere got upset with these restrictions imposed on the party; their political statements and opinions embarrassed the Islah leadership in Riyadh, which led to the suspension of some of those leaders in Yemen. For instance, the party suspended the membership of the Yemeni activist and Nobel Prize winner Tawakkol Karman, following her statements in which she accused the Saudi-led coalition of behaving like an “occupier” in the war in Yemen.
Since the party is represented in the power-sharing government by 20% (5 ministerial portfolios), in addition to being part of the Yemeni Presidential Council by 25%, its political stance have become completely identical with the IRG’s stance, and of course with the Saudi position.
In general, the Islah party has become under the spot of the media of some Arab coalition countries and some local forces supported by those countries. It party has greatly suffered from a systematic campaign to demonise it and to question its patriotism and any political role it plays. The party has been accused to serve the political agendas of Qatar and Turkey, which are believed to have ties with what they claim to be “terrorist organizations” such as the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, the Transitional Council has deliberately come in a conflict with the IRG under this framework, accusing President Hadi of being submissive to the Islah party.
The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
The Yemeni Socialist Party, which was founded in 1978 in the city of Aden, is not in a better situation than the rest of the Yemeni parties. The war that has been going on in Yemen for 10 years has led to imbalances in its internal structure.
Its position on the conflict in Yemen has become gelatinous, vacillating, and its situation has become more complex than the rest.
It was tossed about by the waves of the conflict; between Ansar Allah group, the IRG, the STC, and the Southern Movement, and the leaders and bases of the Socialist Party became vulnerable to polarization by the forces in their geographical surroundings. In other words, the party has placed itself in the grey area, and this is noticeable through its political discourse and political positions that tend to please everyone. Due to this political pragmatism, the socialists of the South became identifiable with the vision of the influential forces in the south, and the socialists of the North became identifiable with Ansar Allah Houthi group. Whereas the socialists of the center in Taiz and the central regions cling to the party’s traditional slogans and principles, and the IRG-affiliated socialists remained silent on many vital issues.
This fluctuation in the party led to its political paralysis, so it evaded the scene, turned back on itself, and we no longer hear about any position, condemnation or statement from it about vital issues such as those related to Yemen’s sovereignty, geography, and political future. However, this point of weaknesses could be turned out to be its point of strength. That is, the YSP has become the party that enjoys the least enmity with all the conflicting parties and therefore it could play a positive role that contributes to achieving peace in Yemen.
Regardless of its position on the war or secession or his alignment with any party, it is considered part of the IRG, as it has acquired two ministerial portfolios (approximately 9%) of the total 24 seats.
The role of political parties in the expected political process
In light of the above, it is clear that the Yemeni political parties, in theory of course, are involved in the political process in Yemen, whether in the Sana’a government or in the Aden government. However, they lack effective decision-making. If we look at the pro-IRG political parties, we can notice how divided they are on vital issues, such as war, coalition, coup, aggression, unity, federalism, sovereignty, and secession. Moreover, these parties suffer from mutual accusations among themselves and questioning of each other’s patriotism. In addition, they hold most of the portfolios in the IRG, and thus their vision has become completely identical to the visions and positions put forward by the government, which of course do not conflict with the vision of regional actors, which may conflict with the interests of the Yemeni people and with achieving sustainable peace.
Saudi-led coalition’s position on Yemeni parties
For long, neighboring countries were not in harmony with most of the Yemeni parties, especially the leftist ones, and this is due to the adoption of a different political system by the Gulf countries, which contradicts the idea of political pluralism, and partisanship in general. After 2014, the Gulf States opened their doors to the leaders of these parties, but this was only out of necessity. On the one hand, they gave them a safe haven, and on the other hand, they contained them and were able to pass their own agendas through them. In other words, those countries impose restrictions on them not to engage in any political activity, unless they are required to do so.
In fact, there remains a crisis of confidence between the coalition countries and the large and influential parties in the Yemeni arena. Saudi Arabia is not satisfied with the GPC after its alliance with its enemy (the Ansar Allah), and is not reassured by the Islamist-leaning Islah Party, which many countries consider as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the UAE does not accept any political role for the Islah party, whether alone or within an alliance of political forces.
Most importantly, the Saudi-led countries, at the beginning of the war, thought that the battle would be easy and short, and that eliminating “the Houthis” would not take long. So they proceeded to give priority to the military solution, marginalizing the role of the political parties to some extent. Not only that, but the political effectiveness of these parties has been undermined by helping to establish armed political entities and supporting them financially, politically and militarily. Consequently, these emerging entities have become the most effective and influential entities in which they are located. At the same time, these entities have become hotbeds of conflict with Yemeni political parties such as the Islah struggle with some other parties such as the Transitional Council.
Conclusion
It can be said that the influential parties have become directly involved in the Yemeni political scene, given that they are represented in the power-sharing government (the IRG). The GPC obtained five ministerial portfolios, and the same for the Islah Party, while the Yemeni Socialist Party obtained two ministerial portfolios, and the remaining ministerial portfolios were distributed to other parties and components. However, despite the presence of these parties in the decision-making center, whether in the Sana’a government or in the Aden government, this means that they play contradicting roles (the role of the government and the role of the opposition) at the same time, and this is an equation that does not allow the parties to practice their political activity independently and in a manner that neither serves the interests of the Yemeni people nor provides sustainable peace to Yemen. This is one aspect, but the other aspect is that the Yemeni parties are not in a position to play a political role even if they wanted to. The complexities of the political and military scene, the different visions of the parties on vital Yemeni issues, the different positions within one party, the division of the parties into wings, and the lack of transparency in the positions of some of them, and the positions of the Saudi-led coalition on those parties or some of them, stand as a stumbling block to contributing a tangible role in the upcoming peace process. Consequently, their role will remain marginal and ineffective. However, in light of the UN standards for involving all political and societal currents in the upcoming political process, the UN envoy will have to involve the Yemeni political parties in the consultations preceding the peace process negotiations, but they will be nothing more than a decoration.
