Political Analysis on Yemeni Affairs – June 24, 2024

Introduction:

Taiz serves as a tragic example, as it has been subjected to a suffocating siege from three directions. It has only one outlet to the west, connecting Taiz to Aden through a route that passes south of Al-Turbah, taking approximately six hours. Previously, the official route between the two cities via Al-Hawban took only around two and a half hours.

During 2015 and 2016, the main roads leading northeast towards the Al-Hawban area, which connects Taiz to all Yemeni governorates, were closed. Additionally, roads leading to the north and northwest, connecting Taiz to densely populated districts within Taiz governorate and the province of Al-Hodeidah, were also blocked. Consequently, the city has remained divided and besieged for over 10 years. This situation has forced citizens to take treacherous and arduous detour routes, exposing them to significant risks and unimaginable suffering, especially for the elderly, women, children, and the sick. Moreover, these alternative routes have led to increased food prices due to higher transportation costs. According to the SAM organization, the cost for citizens to travel from Al-Hawban to the city center has increased from 100 Yemeni rials to 15,000 Yemeni rials. Instead of a 10-minute journey, it now takes over 8 hours through extremely rugged alternative routes, resulting in 481 traffic accidents. These accidents have led to 374 fatalities, 966 injuries, and a financial loss estimated at over 474 million Yemeni rials, according to a report by the local authority in Taiz governorate in July 2023.

Each party has presented its narrative regarding the crossings in Taiz. The internationally recognized government, supported by 16 human rights organizations operating in Yemen, argues that the Ansar Allah Group imposes collective punishment and violates human rights by besieging millions of citizens in Taiz governorate. Taiz holds the highest population in the republic, with its residents accounting for 12.16% of the country’s population, according to the National Information Center. On the other hand, the Ansar Allah Group sees the siege on the city as a result of “mercenaries” affiliated with the aggressor countries and “terrorist and Brotherhood groups,” serving their propaganda and material interests.

There are less stringent narratives that argue that the Ansar Allah group is not intentionally behind the siege of Taiz. They control the eastern, northern, and southeastern parts of the city, while forces from the government’s army are stationed in opposing areas to prevent the group from reentering the city. As a result, these crossings have become hot zones devoid of any inhabitants. Consequently, the internationally recognized government, according to this narrative, shares responsibility for the “siege” of Taiz. In this context, the leader Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi stated in a tweet in May 2022 that his group is ready to open the roads but has set conditions of “ending the fighting” and “withdrawing forces from both sides.” However, the other party believes that this would leave the city vulnerable to the control of the Ansar Allah Group, allowing them to seize the city at any time.

Regardless of the situation, each party has its justifications, and we are not here to support or refute those justifications. What matters here is that this divergence formed a fundamental dilemma in previous peace negotiations, where the internationally recognized government consistently prioritized lifting the siege on Taiz in its agenda, while the Ansar Allah Group denied any involvement in the siege of the city.

While the Ansar Allah Group denied any involvement in the siege of the city or refused to reopen it for security or military reasons, and while the internationally recognized government was unable to provide any solutions to alleviate the suffering of the citizens, relying solely on the UN envoy who, in turn, had limited influence in pushing the conflicting parties towards opening the roads and resorted to appeals, similar to the community initiatives that also reached a dead end, the Ansar Allah Group unexpectedly announced on June 7th, 2024, the opening of two main roads to the city of Taiz. The first road is Al-Hawban, which leads to the city center and is designated for travelers and light transportation. The second road is the Sixty-Fifty Road, which connects the city of Taiz with Al-Noor and Bier Basha, and is designated for heavy and medium trucks. This decision was implemented, according to the acting governor of Taiz appointed by the Ansar Allah Group, Ahmed Al-Mosawa, “based on the directives of the leader of the revolution, Mr. Abdulmalik Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, and the President of the Supreme Political Council, Major General Mahdi Al-Mashat.” Al-Mosawa stated in a press statement that he “comes to the people of Taiz on the occasion of the blessed Eid Al-Adha and the reopening of the main Al-Hawban-Taiz road, in order to alleviate the suffering of the citizens and restore life to its normal state, which the enemy tried to disrupt.”

On the other hand, the internationally recognized government welcomed the initiative to open the roads, and a week later, the head of the negotiating committee, Abdulkarim Shaiban, stated in a press conference:

“We are pleased today (June 13, 2023) to open Al-Kamb road – Al-Qasr roundabout, which has been blocked by the Houthi militia for 9 years, causing suffering to the people of the governorate.” Shaiban added, “The credit for opening the road goes to the resilience of the people of Taiz, their sacrifices, as well as the sacrifices of the army heroes and the Popular Resistance during the siege, until this unjust and aggressive siege on the city was broken.”

The step of opening the main road to the city of Taiz comes after 3 months of the Ansar Allah Group opening a secondary road that connects the Hayfan area in Taiz governorate to the Tur Al-Baha directorate in Lahj governorate, leading to Aden governorate in southern Yemen. It also comes after days of the group’s announcement of opening the road from Al-Bayda governorate to the city of Marib.

This analysis raises questions about the motives that led to the opening of the roads and whether it indicates a path towards peace in Yemen.

Previous Attempts to open Taiz Roads

Taiz roads have taken on a social, humanitarian and political dimension throughout the eight-year period of the siege. On October, 2015, some activists in Ibb governorate launched a humanitarian initiative to lift the siege on the city of Taiz, known as the “Water March”, which was thwarted. Since then The closed roads of Taiz have become at the top of political negotiations agendas, which took place between the IRG and the Ansar Allah group. In December 2015, talks under the auspices of the United Nations were held in the Swiss city of Biel, and it was said that these talks ended with a preliminary deal to lift the siege on Taiz, but nothing happened. In April 2016, the issue of the Taiz roads was raised again in ” Dhahran al-Janoub ” talks. The formation of a committee for supervision and pacification in Taiz was among these talks’ outcomes, and the opening of Taiz roads and crossings was among its provisions, but these talks have failed. In July 2016, the Kuwait peace talks came out with a UN initiative under the auspices of the UN envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh, which included opening the crossings in Taiz, and in August 2018, the former governor of Taiz, Amin Mahmoud, formed a committee headed by Abdul Karim Shaiban to negotiate with the Ansar Allah group; the committee failed too. In December 2018, the so-called “Stockholm Agreement” was signed under the auspices of the UN envoy Martin Griffiths, which included vital humanitarian provisions, among of which “understandings” to open roads to the city of Taiz, but no progress was made in this regard. “Nobody should have to live like this. And it is a shame on all of us that the agreements made in Stockholm on Taiz have yielded no results,” Griffiths said in his briefing to the Security Council. In October 2019, the former governor of Taiz Governorate, Shawqi Ahmed Hayel, made attempts to open Taiz roads, which caused a societal movement and resulted in moves made by the delegation of the Civil Alliance for Peace and National Reconciliation, headed by Dr. Hammoud Al-Awdi, Chairman of the Coordinating Body of the Alliance. 

In April 2022, the terms of the UN truce, under which military operations were halted, stipulated the opening of Taiz’s roads, but all of these initiatives and agreements failed. Finally, the UN road map of the UN envoy to Yemen included a number of files, starting with the humanitarian file aimed at alleviating the suffering of the Yemeni people, including opening roads, especially the roads of Taiz. However, the entire agreement was put in the drawers until conditions were ready for its signing or collapsed completely, and thus the conflict returned to square one.

Why are the roads opened now?

There are several interpretations behind the Ansar Allah Group’s announcement of opening the roads, especially the opening of Al-Hawban road, including humanitarian, political, economic, and social reasons. It is difficult to reach objective reasons that can explain this action, making the humanitarian motive the most prominent for understanding the motives of this sudden move, especially as it came a few days before Eid Al-Adha, adding a distinct humanitarian aspect to it.

 While emphasizing the importance of this humanitarian dimension, which should be encouraged, strengthened, and sustained, there are other factors that should not be disregarded:

A tactical and preemptive step for peace negotiations:

The issue of opening the roads leading to Taiz City and ending the siege imposed on the city for 9 years has been a central topic in peace negotiations and a key condition that the legitimate government insists on including in any agreement. The failure to open the crossings has become a real obstacle to progress in future peace negotiations, as overcoming this issue in any upcoming negotiations would pose a political embarrassment for the internationally recognized government and the United Nations. This is especially true considering that some provisions of previous agreements, such as the opening of Sana’a airport and ports, have been implemented. Therefore, the Ansar Allah Group may realize the inevitability of opening the roads if they want to advance the roadmap process. It is no secret that the Ansar Allah Group is pushing the Omani mediator to exert pressure on KSA to sign the agreement and threatens to resume the war if it disowns previous understandings. Similarly, KSA is eager to sign agreements but does so cautiously. In other words, the opening of the roads may have come as a result of Saudi-Houthi understandings, facilitated by Omani mediation and pressure. This aims to protect the peace efforts from setbacks caused by local and regional escalation. It appears that both parties are seeking to prevent the complete collapse of these understandings, especially the KSA, which wants to rid itself of the burden of this complex and exhausting file and achieve comprehensive de-escalation in the region, resolving issues with the Ansar Allah Group. Thus, opening the roads to the city of Taiz may serve as the elixir that keeps the roadmap alive.

It can be said that the opening of the roads aligns with what the UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg announced at the end of last year, that the conflicting parties in Yemen are approaching the signing of a roadmap that ends human suffering and paves the way for an upcoming political phase. This is also in line with Grundberg’s recent statement about his efforts to facilitate a direct meeting between the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, and the President of the Supreme Political Council of the Ansar Allah Group, Mahdi Al-Mashat. All of this is consistent with the active role played by the Sultanate of Oman in bridging the gap between the conflict parties. It seems to have a significant role in reopening the roads and lifting the siege on the city of Taiz, and it is not unlikely that Iran is also behind this move.

From here, we can say that the opening of the roads serves as a prelude to unraveling the complex issues before commencing the consultations on the roadmap. Some may wonder why the issue of opening the roads was not left as a negotiating card in the hands of the Ansar Allah Group to be raised in final settlement negotiations.

Perhaps the Ansar Allah Group does not want to leave this contentious point as a bargaining chip in the roadmap agreement, in order not to appear as if it is exploiting this sensitive humanitarian situation for bidding and political calculations. Hence, it seems as if they opened the roads under duress. In other words, if the Ansar Allah Group postponed the opening of the roads and kept it as a negotiating card, it would confirm suspicions about their involvement in the siege of the city. Consequently, they would lose the significant popular sympathy they gained due to their support for the Hamas resistance movement. Now, after the opening of the roads, the issue of road access will have been overcome, and through a humanitarian approach, credit for resolving it will be attributed to the Ansar Allah Group rather than political pressures.

With all that has been mentioned, it is important not to jump to conclusions. The current situation, political statements, and tense rhetoric from the Ansar Allah Group leave readers uncertain about the future of the political process in Yemen. It suggests that the prospects for peace do not appear promising at the present time, given the tensions Yemen is currently experiencing. This includes factors such as the regional situation, particularly the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip, which led the Ansar Allah Group to target Israeli ships and prompted a US-British military response. Additionally, there are economic and media wars between the conflicting parties in Yemen, as well as pessimistic statements issued by the Ansar Allah Group, which lean more towards pessimism than optimism. For example, the recent statement by the head of the negotiation committee and leader in the Ansar Allah Group, Mohammed Abdulsalam, to Al-Mayadeen channel, in which he stated that “Washington seeks to involve KSA in a battle that distracts Yemen from supporting Gaza,” and he warned against “launching any new aggression against Yemen.”

Although the human and political goals remain the closest to understanding this sudden change in the Ansar Allah Group’s approach towards opening the roads, other objectives cannot be ruled out, as they may not be less important:

Dispelling the negative image and absorbing popular anger:

Since November 2023, the Ansar Allah Group has focused its military efforts on naval operations against Israeli ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea, with the aim of pressuring Tel Aviv to stop the aggression on Gaza and lift the blockade. This has garnered significant popular sympathy among Yemenis, known for their historical support for the Palestinian cause.

However, it has been observed through social media campaigns and protests that intensified in the past months in the city of Taiz, under the campaign slogans of “Open the roads” or “White Flags.” Thousands of Taiz residents participated in a massive march on Friday (March 1, 2024) in solidarity with the Palestinian people. They raised Palestinian and Yemeni flags and held banners denouncing the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza and the blockade imposed by the Ansar Allah Group on Taiz for years. The banners carried messages such as “Whoever besieges Taiz cannot break the Israeli blockade on Gaza,” “Houthi and Israel are two sides of the same coin,” and “Palestine is in our hearts, and Taiz is in our blood,” among other slogans.

It is possible that the Ansar Allah Group found itself in a state of popular exposure, as it is not viable to be described as besieging a Yemeni city while seeking to lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. In other words, those chants and slogans may have caused embarrassment for the Ansar Allah Group, which aimed to maintain credibility in its stated goals of lifting the siege on Gaza while dispelling the notion of a “Houthi blockade” that has been ingrained in the minds of many over the course of the 10-year conflict. In summary, perhaps this banner that reads, “Lifting the siege on Taiz is a victory for besieged Gaza,” summarizes the Ansar Allah Group’s response to the popular demands of Taiz’s residents.

Reaction to the Measures of the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden

The opening of roads during the war of the banks between the governments of Sana’a and Aden seems to be a reaction or an economic measure to confront the expected shortage of hard currency in the coming months if the Central Bank in Aden continues to implement its measures, including redirecting all revenues of Yemen Airways to its bank accounts in Aden or abroad, as well as the Ministry Of Communications and Information Technology and other similar measures. This means that the Ansar Allah Group will benefit from the hard currency that citizens withdraw from the provinces under the control of the internationally recognized government and transfer it to the provinces under the Ansar Allah Group’s control.

In the economic context, the 26 September newspaper, affiliated with the Ansar Allah Group, mentioned that “the mercenary government residing in Riyadh hotels has major concerns about opening any port or road connecting the city of Taiz and Al-Hawban. These concerns have nothing to do with the people of Taiz but rather aim to deprive them of the legitimacy to trade the issue of Taiz and exploit the suffering and pain of its people.” The sources clarified that the opening of any road between the city and Al-Hawban will eliminate the label of “siege of Taiz,” and the organizations, associations, the leadership of the hotel government, and officials in the city of Taiz will lose billions of dollars received from the countries of aggression and external funders, which they present under the pretext of humanitarian aid to the city’s residents, while it goes to the accounts of war merchants in Yemen.

Final Note:

There is no doubt that opening the roads is the only moral and humanitarian achievement that has been accomplished in the past 10 years in order to alleviate the suffering of citizens and restore social cohesion. Perhaps only those who have experienced the hardships and dangers of the alternative routes and have had the experience of crossing the checkpoints after a decade-long closure can truly appreciate the real value and overwhelming joy of opening the crossings.

It is not only about the humanitarian aspect, but opening the roads will contribute to the peace process, building trust, and opening up hopes for a future of security and peace. Here, I quote what Hussein Al-Ezzi, an Ansar Allah Group leader, said on the X platform: “In besieged Taiz, there are only a few meters between two points… Yesterday, soldiers exchanged holiday greetings accompanied by mutual invitations for lunch… Yes, we differ greatly, but as soon as the foreign element disappears, we quickly reconcile, and 80% of our problems end when we shake hands with each other. We remain brothers, rejecting foreign aggression and its support.” 

However, this happiness and optimism are tinged with caution, as much as the opening of roads may be a glimmer of hope for peace, it may also become a hotspot for a wider and more comprehensive war. One of the scenes that cannot escape the eye is the signs placed at the contact points between the two sides, where one raises slogans of loyalty to Mr. Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, while the other side raises slogans of “Here, there is no master but the people.” Between these two slogans and between these two closely spaced points, it can be said that this is the thin line that separates war from peace.

Recommendations:

• Many are concerned that if there is any disagreement or recklessness at the contact points from either side, especially in the absence of international, societal, or third-party supervision, the situation may spiral out of control, leading to armed confrontations that could serve as a hotspot for a new wave of conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to allow the intervention of a third party to oversee the contact point between the two sides, preferably under the supervision of the United Nations or a societal entity.
• Both sides should preserve this humanitarian and moral achievement, demonstrate patience, wisdom, and refrain from provocations, and not subject this humanitarian issue to political calculations or bidding. Both sides must realize that the people will not forgive them and will not accept any justifications if any setback occurs to this remarkable step.

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