If Trump wins, will the course of the conflict in Yemen change?
Executive Summary
Due to its global and regional stature and influence, the United States of America plays a significant role in shaping the course of the conflict in Yemen. However, over three presidential terms, its impact has not reached the point of ending the war or to bring peace to Yemen. If Donald Trump returns to the White House at a time when the Israeli war on Gaza continues and the Ansar Allah group (the Houthis) attacks on Israeli ships in the Red Sea persist, this will create new dynamics fraught with numerous challenges and few opportunities. That is, Trump’s return could lead to a shift in power dynamics that may increase tensions and complicate the situation in a way that makes reaching a comprehensive settlement in Yemen more difficult. At best, his potential return may solidify the current status quo of neither war nor peace.
Introduction:
The foundation of American foreign policy- and of all policies in general- is based on its geopolitical position, its power, national economic security, and the availability of “key resources”. In short, it is based on its national interests. Saudi Arabia, the largest OPEC petroleum exporter to the United States, was the source of 7% of U.S. total petroleum imports and 7% of U.S. crude oil imports. For decades, Washington has strong economic and military relations with Riyadh, usually described as strategic. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s oil position places it at the heart of USA foreign policy and being one of the most significant importers of USA arms, together with the UAE, it has accounted for over half of total USA arms exports to the world during the second decade of this century.
The USA policy has long viewed Yemen through the prism of the economic and geopolitical interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which naturally align with USA interests. Therefore, ensuring the security of the Red Sea for the passage of Saudi and Gulf oil tankers has been a constant factor in understanding and shaping USA foreign policy towards Yemen, regardless US Presidents’ political orientations or their party affiliation. The variable in USA policy, however, is how to achieve those interests.
Given that Yemen is situated at one of the most crucial global oil trade routes and has become a battleground for two regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) of great importance to USA, which has become fully engaged in the conflict in Yemen. At this particular point, this involvement led to potential conflicts of interest between Washington and Riyadh. That is, despite the US’s initial drive to help the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to defeat the Ansar Allah group, as the years passed and the civilian death count mounted – and as Ansar Allah improved its offensive capabilities, launching missile attacks on both Saudi and Emirati cities and infrastructure – Washington began to exert pressure on the kingdom to bring an end to the war.
On the other axis, the hostile nature of the relationship between Washington and Tehran is evident in their conflicting ideologies and Tehran’s anti-Israel and anti-Washington rhetoric. That is, Tehran is considered by USA as a potential danger to U.S. interests. Once Washington and Tehran settled some of their disputes, the former has begun seeking to ease the confrontation with the latter. This was a source of concern for Riyadh, which views Tehran as a potential threat as well.
The war in Yemen erupted during the term of former Democratic President Barack Obama in 2015 and will complete its first decade in five months, coinciding with the end of the current Democratic President Joe Biden’s term, which has somewhat mitigated the pace of the war in Yemen. Between these two democratic periods, the war witnessed one of its most violent episodes during the presidency of Republican President Donald Trump (2017-2021), where he adopted a supportive stance towards the Saudi-led coalition. However, the flexible approach taken by the Biden administration has somewhat shifted the conflict into a state of neither war nor peace.
Will the course of the conflict in Yemen change if the controversial Republican President Donald Trump returns to the White House? This paper aims to discuss this issue. To answer this question, we must pose another question regarding whether the USA, under either Democratic or Republican administrations, has an active and decisive role in the decade-long war that has left millions on the brink of starvation.
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The USA Policy towards the Conflict in Yemen
Since the beginning of the war in Yemen, the USA policy towards the conflict in Yemen appears to have been oscillating between supporting the Saudi-led coalition and trying to calm the conflict’s pace. In both cases, USA administrations have emphasized their commitment to protecting the security of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf.
Obama Term
The war was announced from Washington on March 26, 2015, through the then Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Adel Al-Jubeir. Shortly after, a statement was issued by the White House confirming the support of the former President Obama administration for the Arab coalition, logistically and intelligence-wise, and the establishment of a joint planning cell. In April 2015, the USA administration reaffirmed its supportive stance towards the coalition by endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which placed Yemen under Chapter VII and imposed sanctions on the Ansar Allah group leaders and their allies.
The intensity of the war escalated, fighting continued, and airstrikes increased significantly, resulting in more civilian casualties. Humanitarian conditions worsened, leading to increased criticism from relief organizations and human rights groups. After nearly five months since the start of the war (October 2015), these criticisms reached Congress, with some members expressing their criticism of continuing arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, this led to a reduction in USA military, intelligence, and logistical support for the Saudi-led coalition, and the announcement of the suspension of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. These repeated civilian and infrastructure targets coincided with the USA administration’s sense that a military solution did not seem likely. This generated a trend within USA foreign policy circles towards seeking a peaceful settlement. On August 25, 2016, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced an initiative to settle the conflict, known as the “Kerry Peace Initiative”. The basis of the initiative was a ceasefire, the formation of a national unity government excluding former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his deputy Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the inclusion of the Ansar Allah group in the government, and some de-escalation measures such as the withdrawal of the Ansar Allah group weapons from Sana’a, the withdrawal of their forces from the Saudi-Yemeni border areas, and the formation of security committees in areas of intense fighting. The national unity government was to prepare for general elections. However, the initiative did not resonate with Ansar Allah group or the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, leading to its failure. Thus, the Obama administration remained oscillating between its timid support for Saudi Arabia and calls for peace, indicating the limited impact in imposing a practical and sustainable resolution to the conflict.
Trump Term
Donald Trump came to power in the USA determined to rid it of “terrorist groups” that threatened national security, starting his term by announcing the targeting of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen). Regarding his administration’s relationship with Riyadh, it was largely formed through economic dimensions, focusing on billions of dollars in arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Trump believed that halting or reducing these sales might push Saudi Arabia towards Russia or China, or both, as alternative options. Consequently, the years of his presidency witnessed a strengthening of Washington’s ties with Riyadh, which he prioritized with his first foreign visit. During this visit, Trump allowed the resumption of arms sales to Riyadh, which had been suspended by his predecessor, Obama, in the last month of his presidency.
The coalition’s continued airstrikes resulted in numerous civilian casualties, with the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 dominating the headlines of the USA media outlets. This event led civil society organizations and human rights bodies to demand an end to military support for Saudi Arabia and the cessation of the war in Yemen. Opposition to the war reached a point where Trump’s administration, by the end of the month, called on the coalition to stop bombing civilian-populated areas, urged all parties to cease hostilities, and engage in serious negotiations to end the war. Two weeks later, the USA administration announced the suspension of in-flight refueling for the coalition’s aircraft. However, Trump utilized his veto power against the Congress’s resolution requiring his administration to completely withdraw from the war in February 2019. The Senate failed to gather the necessary majority to override the presidential veto. Just 10 days before the end of his presidency, Trump designated the Ansar Allah group as a terrorist organization.
In 2018, forces aligned with the internationally recognized government, supported by the coalition, were on the brink of seizing the city of Hodeidah and its strategic port, controlled by the Ansar Allah group. Yet, Trump’s administration pressured the coalition leadership and the internationally recognized government to halt, stopping the forces just four kilometers away from capturing the port of Hodeidah. This move suggested that Trump’s administration was not keen on resolving the conflict decisively but rather allowed it to sway between two fundamental forces, one backed by Riyadh and the other by Tehran. This seemed to be a constant in USA policy – be Democratic or Republican – towards the conflict in Yemen. Ending the war entirely during that period seemed unlikely due to considerations related to international arms trade, as well as using it as leverage to drain Saudi Arabia and the UAE economically and exert political pressure.
Biden Term
Joe Biden’s victory in the presidency led to further oscillations in USA policy towards the conflict in Yemen. When he delivered his first foreign policy speech on February 4, 2021, he announced several changes regarding the conflict in Yemen, including halting arms sales to Saudi Arabia and pledging to end the war. For this end, he appointed the diplomat Tim Lenderking as a special envoy to Yemen to lead peace efforts, potentially signalling that the USA had decided to move away from the role of war supporter and towards that of a mediator.
In fact, this move was taken under specific circumstances. Biden administration realized that, Quoting Lenderking himself, “the Saudis have frankly struggled with this conflict. They have seen their influence diminish in Yemen. They’ve seen that the Houthis have gained strength on the battlefield. The Houthis are a very determined foe. The Iranians have given support to the Houthis—which is a very unfortunate development for U.S. interests, and ultimately, for Yemenis. So, I think a number of factors have come into play, where the Saudis have really seen the benefit of ending the conflict.
Several days into his presidency, the USA State Department announced the initiation of procedures to remove the Ansar Allah group from the terrorism list that his predecessor, President Trump, had listed them on days before the end of his term. The USA envoy, Lenderking, reinforced this policy by stating that the USA recognizes the Ansar Allah group as a “legitimate player.” These steps can be seen as a return to Obama’s policy, under whom Biden served as Vice President for eight years, and whose term ended with unsuccessful attempts to mediate an end to the conflict.
It is evident from the above that all efforts undertaken by successive USA administrations have not led to tangible progress to set Yemen on the right path towards a just and sustainable peace. This is due to conflicting USA and regional interests, as well as the complexities of the Yemeni political scene and the lack of USA influence over the Ansar Allah group, which has long expressed its displeasure with any USA mediation.
Will Trump’s victory change the course of the conflict in Yemen?
If Donald Trump wins, it is expected that US foreign policy towards Yemen will witness a tangible change that will lead to changes in the course of the conflict. These expectations are based on the following data:
Trump’s personal temperament: This analysis may go against the common belief held by many analysts and politicians that the USA foreign policy is built on solid principles and its decisions are based on studies and strategic analyses, and therefore are not impulsive or subject to change with presidents. In fact, this cannot be doubted; the personal conviction of the president cannot override official political and party institutions, and often these institutions impose decisions on him that do not align with his personal inclinations, beliefs, and priorities. However, at the same time, the personality and charisma of the head of state cannot be denied in steering foreign policy in one direction or another, as some previous events have shown. For example, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration worked for years to reach, and also evident in the Biden administration’s decision to remove the Ansar Allah group from the list of terrorist organizations, which Trump had included them in.
Trump’s business mentality: It has become apparent that the economic factor distinguished Trump’s administration’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, as this relationship was based on a profit-loss equation – money for protection. Therefore, if re-elected, Trump may think with a business mentality, making arms sales a source of improving the USA economy. Ending the war entirely in Yemen may not serve this strategy based on increasing arms exports and protecting the kingdom from any external threats, especially from the Ansar Allah group or from Iran, both of which have become lucrative sources of income for Washington. On the other hand, stability in Yemen may be in favor of USA investments in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, which seeks to exit the Yemeni file and focus on its Vision 2030 economic plan. In short, the war in Yemen will be weighed in terms of profit and loss. If ending the war favors the USA interests and secures its ally Israel, then a peaceful resolution through negotiations will likely remain the preferred option for the Trump administration, and vice versa.
Hostile Attitude Towards Iran: The USA administration works to protect its national security and enhance its geopolitical and economic interests worldwide, especially in the Middle East region. One of the key interests is safeguarding global oil routes and countering Iran and its “proxies.” Washington considers the Ansar Allah group as an Iranian arm and a manifestation of Iranian policy in the region. Therefore, weakening them will be a fundamental part of Trump’s upcoming strategy.
The Ansar Allah Group’s Anti-Israel Stance: Trump, backed by the Republican Party, prioritizes support for Israel. Given the military capabilities demonstrated by the Ansar Allah group, which have enabled them to target Israeli territory with their missiles, alongside their ideologically resistant and anti-American, anti-Israeli, and generally anti-Western rhetoric, it is unlikely that Trump will underestimate these capabilities that now pose a strategic threat to the state of Israel.
Normalization with Israel and the Reaction of Key Players in the Yemeni Conflict: Trump and Republicans, in general, emphasize the importance of rebuilding USA alliances in the region. As a result, relations and strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and most Gulf countries are expected to significantly strengthen. As part of this relationship, Trump will push Riyadh towards normalization with Israel. However, this will be challenging without meeting Saudi conditions, including signing a defense agreement with the USA. If such an agreement is reached, Iran and its allies may work to disrupt the completion of this normalization deal by attempting to destabilize the situation, which will negatively impact peace efforts in Yemen. Any deal leading to the signing of a defense agreement between Washington and Riyadh will put the latter and its allies, the internationally recognized Yemeni government, in a better political and military position, making them stronger negotiators. While this will strip the Ansar Allah group of many of their strengths and weaken their position in the conflict, it will necessitate a recalibration of the power dynamics resulting from the success of this deal, leading to renegotiations on the previously agreed roadmap and many other issues. This may provoke the Ansar Allah group and Iran, potentially escalating the situation to a new phase of escalation.
Trump and His Relationship with International Actors: There are positive indicators that could serve stability in Yemen, such as President Trump potentially adopting a conciliatory stance towards Russia and stepping back from military and political support for Ukraine. This would contribute to bringing the Yemeni file back into the international spotlight and seeking to create practical opportunities for peace. In other words, any rapprochement between Russia and the USA will directly or indirectly impact the conflict in Yemen, as Moscow may push towards a more balanced political settlement for the Yemeni crisis.
Washington, especially the Republican wing, views Beijing as a threat to its national security and a danger to its economy. The Trump administration has previously threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese goods. In light of Washington’s concerns about China’s expanding influence in the Middle East and the Gulf region in particular, which has become a primary stage for this influence and competition, and given China’s recent efforts to engage in Yemeni affairs—especially after achieving a significant diplomatic breakthrough resulting in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh—it is likely that Trump will seek to keep China out of the competition and influence sphere. For this, he needs to offer better diplomatic alternatives that could end the war and bring peace to Yemen.
Concluding Remarks
In light of the above, it can be said that if the conflicting Yemeni parties do not reach an agreement to end the conflict in Yemen before January 20, 2025, and this coincides with the potential return of former President Trump to the White House, it could create new dynamics in the Yemeni political scene that will definitely impact the trajectories of war and peace.
