Can China broker peace in Yemen
Executive Summary:
China has consistently refrained from intervening in the conflict in Yemen, fearing that taking a stance would be perceived as favoring one side over another, especially since it maintains good relations with all parties and seeks to please all. However, with the escalation of the conflict and its spillover beyond Yemen’s borders, coupled with the evolving relationship between Riyadh and Beijing, and the relative decline of Western influence in advancing the peace process, China, as a major economic power, finds itself inclined to engage in the new dynamics of the conflict, seeking to maximize the opportunities presented in this phase and establish a foothold in Yemen’s reconstruction efforts post-war.
Although Saudi Arabia has become increasingly important to China, the latter attempts to maintain an equal distance from all local and regional parties, making it a prominent candidate to bridge the anticipated political and humanitarian gaps between the Ansar Allah group (the Houthis) and its opponents. It is difficult to speculate on the effectiveness of Chinese diplomacy in resolving the Yemeni conflict. While Beijing is qualified to play a mediator role, the Yemeni conflict is multifaceted, involving multiple layers, factions, and the interests of major global and regional powers. Therefore, any Chinese diplomatic effort to end the war will depend on the desires and interests of those countries.
Introduction :
China has consistently refrained from direct engagement in the conflict in Yemen and has maintained a relatively neutral stance towards all local and regional parties involved since the outbreak of the military conflict in Yemen in 2015. This is a traditional strategy that China has followed in dealing with complex Middle East issues, aiming to create a balanced policy that accommodates all parties. However, with the failure of the United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, in extending the humanitarian ceasefire announced at the beginning of April 2022, which ended in October 2022, and the stagnation of his efforts to advance the peace process, China’s position on the current crisis in Yemen came to the forefront. China successfully facilitated a historic agreement on March 10, 2023, which restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries play a pivotal role in the Yemeni conflict as the main supporters of the warring parties (the internationally recognized government and the Ansar Allah group, respectively).
Today, with the decline of American efforts to push forward a stalled peace process in Yemen over the years and Riyadh’s desire to disengage from the Yemeni conflict, many questions arise regarding the possibility of China’s involvement in ending the war and achieving the anticipated political settlement in Yemen. This analysis aims to discuss the potential for China’s engagement and the success of its efforts in this regard.
Historical Overview of the Sino-Yemeni Relationship
The Sino-Yemeni relationship is not a new or emergent relationship, whether with what was known as the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) or with what was known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), which merged in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen.
The beginning of the relationship between China and “North Yemen” dates back to the late 1950s when the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen at the time established official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. This relationship strengthened with the launch of the republican system that overthrew the monarchy in 1962. The Chinese government recognized the new republican system, and the diplomatic relationship between the two countries solidified at the ambassadorial level. Since then, China has maintained a distinctive diplomatic and economic relationship with the “Yemen Arab Republic.” A testament to the depth of this relationship is the major infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese companies to connect the main cities in Yemen and the exploration and production of Yemeni oil in the early 1980s. At that time, the production level by Chinese companies operating in Yemen accounted for nearly 8% of Yemen’s total daily production.
Regarding “South Yemen,” the relationship between China and South Yemen dates back to the post-independence period after the British occupation ended in November 1967. In a fervent ideological competition between China and the Soviet Union at that time, Beijing quickly established friendly relations with the emerging “Yemen Socialist Government.” Ambassadors were exchanged, agreements were signed in various fields, and China sought to enhance its ideological interests by supporting regional leftist movements. At that time, China did not have diplomatic relations with any of the Arab Gulf countries. On the economic front, China began directing its economic assistance to implement many development projects, such as establishing a textile factory and paving the Aden-Al-Mukalla road, which stretches 315 miles. By 1980, the development assistance provided to South Yemen amounted to approximately 84 million US dollars, which was considered at the time as one of the largest Chinese aid programs, both in the Middle East and in any other place in the Third World[1].
Since the unification of Yemen, China has engaged in significant investments with the Republic of Yemen. Agreements were signed to build natural gas power plants in Yemen and expand container ports in Aden and Al Mukha. As a reaffirmation of this strong economic relationship, Yemen became the destination of Huawei’s first major international sale in 1999[2]. In addition to investment projects, Yemen has also received Chinese support and assistance at different points in time, indicating that China has made its economic activity a means to foster friendly relations with the local government and maintain them[3].
In the context of this relationship, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Yemen, Shao Zheng, emphasized the depth of this relationship in an extensive interview with the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper a few days ago. He stated, “This year marks the 68th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Yemeni diplomatic relations,” adding, “Chinese-Yemeni cooperation in the past revolved around traditional industries, but today it revolves around new energy.” Yemen has abundant solar energy resources, and many Yemeni families have solar panels manufactured in China. As we know, Yemen faces problems and shortages in electricity generation, and Chinese companies have expertise in this field. With the improvement of the situation in Yemen and the establishment of peace, China and Yemen will begin to cooperate in the field of new and clean energy, as well as other areas.
China’s Role in the Peace Process
Since the beginning of the conflict in Yemen during the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, China has been partially involved in regional and international efforts to prevent Yemen from descending into a full-scale civil war. It contributed to facilitating the peaceful transition of power, the signing of the Gulf Initiative, and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC).
Following the rise of the Ansar Allah group to power in September 2014, their expansion into southern provinces and the capture of the city of Aden in southern Yemen, the Saudi-led Arab coalition was formed. This coalition supported the government of former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had relocated to Riyadh. The coalition’s formation was in response to UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which recognized Hadi’s government as the legitimate authority, imposed an arms embargo on the Ansar Allah group, called for their disarmament and withdrawal from cities, and granted the Arab coalition the green light to intervene militarily to restore Hadi’s authority in Sana’a. The People’s Republic of China voted in favor of the resolution and continued to support subsequent UN resolutions that, on the whole, favored the Saudi-led Arab coalition and the internationally recognized government. This indicates that China approached the Yemeni issue primarily from an economic interests perspective. Additionally, at that stage, China did not have strong contacts with the Ansar Allah group.
In 2016, when the Ansar Allah group and their political allies, notably former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed an alliance, China considered it a setback to the United Nations’ efforts to end the war. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a statement that it supports the internationally recognized government and does not agree with unilateral actions that could complicate the situation. It expressed hope that the parties involved in Yemen would continue dialogue to resolve their differences and reach a fair settlement acceptable to all parties based on UN resolutions and initiatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despite this dissatisfaction, China maintained a balanced relationship with the Ansar Allah group that did not disturb or provoke their sensitivities. It seems that the Ansar Allah group, too, understood the Chinese position, which is not necessarily supportive of the Saudi position but rather aimed at protecting its strategic interests in the Gulf, with oil being a key factor.
During the ongoing conflict in Yemen, China has consistently sought diplomatic breakthroughs to resolve the conflict. In 2018, China presented a four-point plan to end the war, calling for an immediate ceasefire, reopening of ports, political dialogue, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Both the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the Ansar Allah group welcomed the Chinese initiative, considering it a unique proposal among the various initiatives related to resolving the Yemeni conflict. By 2023, Shao Zheng held five separate meetings with members of the Yemeni Presidential Council. In line with the international efforts to de-escalate the situation in Yemen, China facilitated preliminary tripartite ceasefire talks between the Presidential Council, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and the Ansar Allah group in early April 2023.
Why is China getting involved in Yemen now?
China’s balanced approach, its attempt to maintain equal distance from all conflicting parties, and its desire to secure a position for itself in post-war Yemen, all constitute essential foundations that call for China’s contribution to resolving the Yemeni crisis. However, this contribution will be driven by China’s economic interests.
While Beijing is getting closer to the Yemeni file, the United States and the West, in general, are moving away from it. In other words, Western and American efforts to push for peace have noticeably declined. It appears that the Biden administration is no longer eager to end the war as it was before October 7, 2023. Instead, it is exerting pressure on Riyadh to freeze or backtrack on the separate negotiation steps it has taken with the Ansar Allah group. This is not favored or desired by Riyadh, which has reached a firm conviction about the impossibility of a military solution after nine years of war. Considering the humanitarian consequences of the war and its cost on the Saudi economy and overall stability in the Kingdom, particularly as Saudi Arabia is working towards achieving the goals of Vision 2030, one of which is political and security stability, Riyadh is employing all its diplomatic capabilities to exit the conflict in Yemen. Among these capabilities is leveraging Chinese influence with the Yemeni parties to create favorable conditions and bring the parties to the negotiation table with the aim of signing the roadmap that emerged from the Saudi-Houthi understandings during 2023. This roadmap was announced by the UN envoy at the end of the previous year under the name “Roadmap for Peace.”
It is important to note the perspective of the Yemeni parties toward the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, which does not seem to be fully confident in his approach and strategies towards the peace process in Yemen. The Ansar Allah group sees him as representing American and Saudi interests, while the Yemeni government believes his goal is to push through agreements and exert pressure that favors the Ansar Allah group.
Considering Saudi Arabia’s desire to disengage from the Yemeni file and the absence of international influencers in the arena, China has found the atmosphere conducive to fill the “strategic void” left by the United States and Britain due to their engagement in targeting the Ansar Allah group’s military sites and the decline of their diplomatic influence as a result of their support for the Israeli aggression.
What are China’s prospects for achieving peace in Yemen?
Currently, it appears that China has more advantages than others in pushing forward the peace process in Yemen. This is due to its relationships with all parties involved, and it seems to have gained the trust of the United Nations to play a prominent role in Yemen after its success in the Saudi-Iranian understandings. Here, Shao affirms that Beijing is coordinating with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, the five permanent members of the Security Council, and other relevant parties to advance the peace roadmap in Yemen. He calls on the Yemeni parties to come to the table and urgently sign a peaceful agreement.
Iran’s sponsorship of the Iranian-Saudi agreement may have sparked its appetite to expand its diplomacy in other issues in the Middle East, and undoubtedly, one of the most important of these issues is the Yemeni issue. After the normalization agreement between the two countries in March 2023, the Chinese government expressed its readiness to support the peace process in Yemen. On several occasions, it expressed concern about the instability caused by the war in Yemen, particularly within the United Nations Security Council. The latest expression of this concern was during the UN Security Council meeting on Yemen on April 17, 2023. Deputy Permanent Chinese Representative to the United Nations, Geng Shuang, praised China’s success in helping restore Iranian-Saudi relations. He stated that China is prepared to “continue efforts to enhance regional peace, stability, and achieve lasting peace in Yemen.” This is in line with the diplomatic efforts carried out by the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in Yemen, Shao Zheng, who recently held five separate meetings with the President of the Presidential Council, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, and council members. They, in turn, called on the People’s Republic of China to play a greater role in ending the ongoing conflict in Yemen, which has lasted for over 9 years. They urged Beijing to exert real and influential pressure on Tehran to cease its “continuous interventions” in Yemen’s internal affairs and to stop supporting the “Ansar Allah group.”
Similarly, Saudi Arabia states that it trusts China. According to the Saudi Kingdom News website, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said that Saudi Arabia “fully trusts” China and seeks to promote sustainable development of bilateral cooperation. Likewise, Shao Zheng praised Saudi Arabia’s efforts to achieve peace in Yemen and described them as “positive.” He also mentioned that the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jaber, is a “dear friend” whom he has met repeatedly.
Beijing cautiously engages with all major actors in Yemen, including the Houthi group. However, in recent times, with the escalation of attacks in the Red Sea, China has shown increased openness towards the group. Chinese officials have met with Ansar Allah group representatives in the Omani capital, Muscat, possibly to secure the passage of their imports and exports through the Red Sea. In fact, Beijing has consistently called on the international community to support all major warring factions, including the Ansar Allah group, in their pursuit of lasting peace in the country.
China, like other countries, recognizes that the Ansar Allah group is the most powerful military force on the ground. Ultimately, if China wants to secure its future investments in Yemen, it must maintain friendly relations with the group. This Chinese approach was evident when the Ministry of Oil and Minerals in the Sana’a government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese company “Anton Oil” for oil exploration investments, which was later canceled. The Chinese government officially apologized to the internationally recognized Yemeni government for this incident. In the context of communication with the Ansar Allah group, the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in Yemen stated that “China maintains communication with the Ansar Allah group and other relevant parties to understand their true intentions and make joint efforts to achieve peace in Yemen,” as described by him. This is evident from what the Nabaa News Agency reported about the leader of the Ansar Allah group, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, revealing “America’s efforts to seek China’s assistance in mediating and convincing us to stop our support for the Palestinian people.” This indicates that Beijing is accepted by the Ansar Allah group.
According to the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in Yemen, Shao Zheng, China has “intensive communication with the General People’s Congress, the Socialist Party, and other Yemeni parties.” In this context, he stated that the visit of a delegation from the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah Party) to Beijing on June 26, 2024, reflects the extent of communication with all Yemeni parties.
In this context, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (The Islah party), the largest political component of the Yemeni legitimacy, revealed “strong relations” with the Chinese government. They expressed their readiness to play a mediation role in supporting regional and international efforts to achieve a peace agreement in Yemen, “especially after Beijing sought to facilitate meetings that resulted in reconciliation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran.”
Similarly, in terms of communication with these Yemeni components, regardless of their different political orientations, Beijing has worked on developing its relationship with the STC and maintained open lines of communication with the Council’s President, Aidarus Al-Zoubaidi, as mentioned by the Al-Ayyam newspaper.
Can Chinese efforts succeed in achieving their objectives?
Theoretically, yes. China is qualified to play the role of a neutral mediator as it maintains balanced relationships and open communications with all actors in the Yemeni and regional arena who show openness to Beijing and commend its contributions to the political solution process. They even request Beijing to play a greater role in the peace process.
However, practically speaking, the conflict in Yemen is no longer solely a Yemeni affair and has never been. It is a multi-polar and multi-interest conflict. Given the strategic importance of Yemen’s location, its stability holds geopolitical, economic, and security significance for major powers’ interests. Hence, it can be said that everyone seeks to settle the conflict and end the war in Yemen, but through the lens of their own economic, geopolitical, security, and military interests, disregarding the public interests of Yemenis. This is where the problem lies, and initiatives and mediations fail. If the goal of ending the war conflicts with the interests of those influential countries or one of them, Chinese efforts will face an extremely challenging test that may be impossible to overcome.
Concluding Remarks:
In light of the aforementioned, it can be said that Chinese diplomacy will seize the opportunity presented to it due to the changing dynamics of the conflict in the region. Therefore, it will not remain on the sidelines but is expected to play a central role in de-escalating the Yemeni crisis and adopt a more interactive approach. However, this shift will be cautious, and it may not follow a clear and consistent path towards resolving the conflict in Yemen. Instead, China may attempt to position itself in gray areas. In any case, Beijing will resort to regional actors such as Oman and Iran to seek assistance in achieving any political breakthrough in the Yemeni political process.
[1] Fred Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy 1967–1982,” doctoral thesis, London School of Economics, Department of International History (April 1985), p. 285.
[2] Eric Thun and Timothy Sturgeon, “When Global Technology Meets Local Standards,” in Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (eds.), Policy, Regulation and Innovation in China’s Electricity and Telecom Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 191.
[3] Yahya Alawd, Muhammad Fuad bin Othman, and Norafidah Binti Ismail, “The Political Relations between Yemen and the People’s Republic of China during Ali Abdullahs Saleh’s Administration from 1990 to 2012,” International Journal of Management and Applied Science, 3, no. 1 (March 2017): 16–44.
