| The American Role in the Conflict in Yemen: Diminishing Hope for an Imminent End to the War |
| Executive Summary: Hopes for achieving peace in Yemen are fading, particularly in light of statements made by the US Ambassador to Yemen, Steven Fagin. He stated that a political solution in Yemen remains elusive and “the Yemeni government cannot sign a deal that leaves the Houthis with unrestrained access to weapons”, referring to the peace roadmap presented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations. The KSA made concessions to the Ansar Allah Group in an effort to safeguard its national security and exit the Yemeni conflict, prioritizing its own economic interests. These concessions were made when the KSA realized it had been abandoned by the US and left alone at a time when it needed the US support. The US did not restrain the Ansar Allah Group, allowing them to target Saudi territory with missiles and drones. Following the October 7th “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” the situation changed, and the US began seeking assistance to curb the activities of the Ansar Allah Group. They designated them as a terrorist organization and launched military strikes, but these actions proved ineffective. Pressure was then exerted on the KSA to postpone signing an agreement to end the war, including an economic aid package for the Ansar Allah Group that had been agreed upon in previous negotiations. There are indications that the US is encouraging both the KSA and the internationally recognized Yemeni government to tighten the economic and banking restrictions on the Ansar Allah Group. Additionally, the US is flirting with the KSA over a potential normalization deal with Israel. If this deal is concluded, it could undermine KSA’s security concerns and may lead to the abandonment of commitments made to the Ansar Allah Group. This could provoke the Ansar Allah and reignite the conflict. The KSA finds itself at a crossroads between two options: “security in exchange for ending the war and supporting the economy” represented by their understanding with the Ansar Allah Group, or “normalization in exchange for defense.” Given the KSA’s economic and heightened security interests, it appears that the KSA is leaning towards the second option. The US punitive policy, implemented through the KSA against the Ansar Allah Group, may further complicate the Yemeni situation, making it increasingly challenging to reach a peace agreement. Consequently, it can be said that the long-awaited peace process in Yemen is hanging by a thread… |
Introduction
The conflict in Yemen is multifaceted and shaped by complex local, regional and international dynamics. The United States and Saudi Arabia are the main actors at play. For decades, there have been two constants in their relations: Saudi’s oil and security.
The Ansar Allah group (known as the Houthis) came to power in September 2014, after they had overthrown the government of former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Ansar Allah’s control over the capital, Sana’a, and its expansion throughout Yemen, especially on the Saudi’s eastern and southern borders was considered a threat to Saudi’s strategic and security interests. Moreover, Ansar Allah’s close ties with Iran (the arch enemy of Riyadh and Washington) had played into Washington and Riyadh’s fear. Therefore, Washington had to provide military and logistical support to Saudi Arabia, which in turn was in the interest of both countries.
Thus, fighting Ansar Allah, and behind them Iran, became a common goal for Washington and Riyadh. Likewise, Ansar Allah and Tehran have two common enemies: Riyadh and Washington. Consequently, the war in Yemen came to be seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Saudi Arabia chose to go to war under the pretext of restoring the Hadi government, and the Obama and Trump administrations supported it militarily, politically, and logistically. They justified their support through the prism of U.S. geopolitical and economic interests.
When President Biden assumed the presidency at the beginning of 2021, he made major changes in Washington’s policy towards Riyadh, especially regarding its war in Yemen. He halted precision-guided munitions sales to Saudi Arabia and promised to end the war. Also, he appointed the diplomat, Tim Lenderking, as a special envoy to Yemen to lead peace efforts, in a clear indication that the United States had shifted its role from a war partner to a mediator.
In general, the Biden administration dealt with the Ansar Allah group as a “rebel group,” supported by Iran, which means that it was a local Yemeni movement that rebelled against the Yemeni authority at the time for one reason or another. Therefore, it did not represent an actual threat to American interests directly, and it can be contained through soft power instead of direct military interventions. Moreover, containing Ansar Allah rather than defeating it would contribute to creating power balances in the region that were in America’s economic and security interests.
On March, 2023, China (America’s strong economic rival) sponsored an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (a close partner of Washington) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (an arch enemy of Washington). The Chinese move alarmed Washington, which has always prided itself on being an engineer of diplomatic rapprochements in the region.
One month later, direct negotiations between the Ansar Allah group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were announced, with Omani mediation, and the delegations of both parties met in Sana’a (April 2023) and Riyadh (September 2023). Several media outlets reported that both parties were about to sign a peace deal according to which the war would end, with huge Saudi incentives to Ansar Allah.
These talks took place outside the framework of American diplomacy, and brought to the fore a possible Chinese role in sponsoring these negotiations. This sparked an extensive discussion in the United States about the repercussions of these talks on American interests.
Many American political circles expressed their concern that any agreement outside the American umbrella would constitute a setback for American diplomacy in the region, not to mention that the potential sponsor of these negotiations was China, the United States’ strongest competitor. However, Washington welcomed these negotiations, perhaps reluctantly. Whatever the case, Washington stressed on a UN-led role rather than bilateral talks. On May, 2023, Timothy Lenderking, U.S. special envoy for Yemen, commented: “We continue to believe that this is the best opportunity for peace in Yemen since the war began…This agreement must pave the way for an inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni political process under [UN] auspices”. Such statements indicated that although the Washington was supportive of the peace process per se, it was not completely supportive of Saudi-Houthi bilateral negotiations.
The American Stance on the Conflict in Yemen after “October 7th“
The “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” carried out by Hamas on October 7th, 2023, had profound implications for the Yemen conflict. It effectively blocked Israeli ships and those heading to Israeli ports from navigating the southern Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The Ansar Allah Group targeted non-compliant ships, justifying their attacks as a means to pressure Israel into halting aggression in Gaza and allowing the entry of essential supplies.
The events in the Red Sea naturally raised concerns for the US, Britain, and Western nations due to the strategic significance of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This vital sea passage connects Europe, Asia, and Africa, playing a crucial role in international trade, particularly the transport of approximately 4.7 million tons of crude oil daily. The US has long sought to limit external and regional influences over the strait.
Following a month of the Ansar Allah Group attacks on Israeli ships, the US announced on December 19th, 2023, the establishment of an international alliance called the “Guardian of Prosperity.” This multinational alliance aims to safeguard trade in the Red Sea.
The escalation of the Ansar Allah Group actions against the US interests heightened pressure on the US and posed challenging dilemmas. The available options ranged from a desire to respond militarily to the group, risking provocation of Iran and the broader resistance axis, potentially expanding the conflict beyond Gaza and the Red Sea. Alternatively, an alternative approach was to weaken the group by suspending incentives previously offered by the Biden administration, such as removing them from the list of terrorist organizations and revitalizing the economy, or exploring avenues to end the war and support Yemen’s economy.
In terms of the first aspect, the Biden administration, in mid-January of this year, reclassified the Ansar Allah Group as a “global terrorist organization” after having removed them from that list earlier in 2021. Subsequently, the administration launched a series of airstrikes against the Ansar Allah Group-affiliated targets, indicating a shift away from soft diplomacy with the group.
Regarding the second aspect, Hamas’ “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” on October 7th, 2023, altered the US perception of the conflict and the Saudi-Houthi agreement. It appears that the US no longer encourages the KSA’s withdrawal from the Yemen conflict until a clearer understanding of the situation in Gaza, the Red Sea, and the broader regional dynamics emerges. The US fears that signing an agreement would strengthen the Ansar Allah Group’s influence, potentially fueling their appetite for attacking American, British, and Israeli ships.
According to the Al-Arabi Newspaper on December 20, 2023, Saudi officials have stated that the US is exerting pressure on the KSA to refrain from signing an agreement with the Ansar Allah Group in Yemen. This pressure is a result of the group’s escalation in the Red Sea and its disruption of international navigation. Similarly, The Guardian newspaper, on December 12, 2023, cited American officials who stated that the US has warned the Ansar Allah Group that the peace plan for Yemen that was negotiated with the KSA and handed to the UN peace envoy will fail if attacks on merchant shipping off the coast of Yemen continue.
Based on this, one can interpret the current American position, as expressed by the US Ambassador to Yemen, Steven Fagin, who stated in a recent virtual forum organized by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) that “the ideal end state for Yemen is a peaceful nation progressing toward sustainable economic development, without posing threats to the region or the international community.” However, there is a very challenging path ahead to achieve that. Fagin added that “the path ahead is challenging. Simplistic solutions are not viable for Yemen’s complex problems.” He further emphasized that the role of the international community in creating the necessary conditions to facilitate the peace process in Yemen is crucial, but at present, we are far from that.
It seems that discussions about peace are no longer encouraging for the US and the Western nations in general, and the optimism derived from the KSA agreements with the Ansar Allah Group, which was expected to lead to a political process, is no longer valid. It is natural for such statements to come from the US ambassador, as they are based on what is happening in the corridors of international politics and confirmed information from within the closed circles of Saudi politics. Additionally, it is based on the US assessment of the escalatory trends in the Red Sea and the war in Gaza.
At the end of last May, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden made an announcement regarding the suspension of transactions with several banks and financial institutions operating in areas under the control of the Ansar Allah Group. The stated reason behind this action was the failure of these banks to comply with the law, their ongoing dealings with a designated terrorist group, and their execution of instructions in violation of banking regulations and the law. Economic experts believe that this measure is likely to undermine the authority of the Ansar Allah Group and restrict its access to foreign currency.
Regardless of whether the US is responsible for this measure or not, what holds significant importance is the perception of the Ansar Allah Group. The group views this decision as an “economic aggression and a dangerous step.” Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, the leader of the group, stated that it represents an aggression against the economic sphere, an aggressive step, and a perilous game. He further added that pressuring banks in Sana’a is part of the US actions in support of the Israeli entity.
The American agency Bloomberg shares a similar perspective. In a report released just three days ago, on June 6, 2023, it stated that the actions taken by the CBY in Aden serve as punitive measures employed by the United States to halt the attacks of the Ansar Allah Group in the Red Sea and nudge them towards seeking peace. The report highlights that the US has communicated to all parties, including the KSA, that the key components of the roadmap resulting from the Saudi-Houthi agreements, facilitated by the US and agreed upon in December of the previous year, cannot progress unless the group ceases its ongoing hostile naval campaign, which has persisted for more than seven months. A US State Department official, cited by Bloomberg, emphasized that the agreements tied to the roadmap, devised by the UN, cannot be sustained unless the Ansar Allah Group discontinues its attacks in the Red Sea. Concurrently, alongside the US decision concerning the UN peace plan, the CBY, which is an integral part of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, supported by the KSA and based in Aden, has implemented a series of measures targeting banks operating within Houthi-controlled territories. These measures are likely to erode the authority of the Ansar Allah Group and restrict their access to foreign currency. According to four individuals familiar with the situation, as reported by Bloomberg, the actions taken by the CBY enjoy support from the US and its Western allies and likely possess implicit approval from the KSA, who provides financial support to the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden and the CBY.
Here, an important question comes to mind: Can the KSA sacrifice its achievements in negotiations with the Ansar Allah Group in 2023?
Nine years have passed since a fierce war has exhausted the main parties in the conflict (the KSA and the Ansar Allah Group), without any signs of a conclusive resolution or clear victory for either side. However, this war has diminished the KSA’s military prestige while granting the Ansar Allah Group a significant morale boost and military experience, enabling them to target Saudi cities with their drones and missiles. Consequently, the agreements between the KSA and the Ansar Allah Group represented a turning point in the Yemen conflict. The KSA sought security guarantees to avoid military strikes, the establishment of a buffer zone on the Yemeni-Saudi border in exchange for a permanent ceasefire, the payment of salaries to all civilian and military employees in areas under the authority of the Ansar Allah Group, as well as the operation of new commercial flights to and from Sana’a Airport and unimpeded fuel shipments to the port of Hodeidah.
The main driving force behind these negotiations for the KSA was the security concern, especially since the KSA recently adopted the 2030 economic vision aimed at creating a prosperous and diversified economy, which cannot be achieved without a stable and secure environment. It has become evident that the talks in Riyadh in September 2023 and the previous talks in Sana’a in April 2023 were, in fact, negotiations between the real actors (the KSA and the Ansar Allah Group). This means that the agreements were exclusively between these two parties, which sparked resentment from other active parties in the conflict, such as the internationally recognized government, the Southern Transitional Council, the Republican Guard, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This was one of the obstacles facing the KSA in moving forward with the agreement, which it recently overcame by handing over the file to the UN. This resulted in the adoption of the so-called roadmap by the UN envoy, which was accepted by all parties at the end of 2023. The KSA aimed to play the role of mediator between the Ansar Allah Group and other opposing Yemeni parties.
The insistence of the KSA on describing its role in the negotiations as that of a mediator was the main hurdle that delayed the signing of the agreement. The Ansar Allah Group rejects this description entirely, as they believe that the KSA, from their perspective, is the primary party responsible for initiating the war and should bear the responsibility for reconstruction. Therefore, we can say that the negotiations between the KSA and the Ansar Allah Group took place under specific security conditions, with the most prominent theme being “security in exchange for economy, an end to the conflict.”
It is important to note that this security concern for the KSA arose after the Biden administration took office in early 2021, with the KSA feeling abandoned by the US on the defense level. It is important to briefly revisit the spring of 2022 when the Ansar Allah Group targeted giant oil facilities belonging to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) in the cities of Jeddah and Jazan with unprecedented missile and drone attacks, resulting in significant material damage and huge financial losses for the KSA.
Those attacks sent a crucial message that all Saudi cities were within the reach of the Ansar Allah Group’s fire. At that time, the KSA requested the US to punish the Ansar Allah Group by reinstating them on the list of terrorist organizations, but the US did not do so, citing humanitarian reasons.
Naturally, those attacks clearly indicated that the KSA’s air defense systems were no longer efficient in countering the Ansar Allah Group drones and missiles, especially after the US withdrawal of the Patriot missile system and the THAAD thermal air defense system from the KSA in mid-2021. These systems were previously reinforced by the US following the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019, which led to a halt in the production of approximately 5.7 million barrels of crude oil per day. At that time, Iran was accused of being behind those attacks.
The escalating Saudi concerns were accompanied by warnings that the Ansar Allah Group posed a threat to international navigation in the southern Red Sea, preparing explosive-laden boats and maritime mines to target oil tankers, engage in piracy, or target Saudi ports. This indicates that Saudi Arabia took those “threats” seriously.
Riyadh has repeatedly criticized the Western position in general and the US in particular on their silence towards Ansar Allah’s attacks, and warned that attacks would have global repercussions. Not only this; several Saudi writers and journalists pointed their fingers at America, claiming that it had a role in attacking oil facilities. For example, journalist Adhwan AlAhmary, Editor-in-Chief of Independent Arabia, owned by the Saudi Research Group, said on March 2022, “Houthi intensive targeting of oil facilities in Saudi Arabia is not a coincidence and has nothing to do at all with obstructing the Yemeni peace talks that will be held. He tweeted, “”Look for the one who benefits from putting pressure on Saudi Arabia to reduce oil prices and increase production. There are those who are trying to blackmail Saudi Arabi through more than one axis, and they will not benefit,” referring to the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Saudi-American relations and the Yemen war in general.
During the first three months of 2022, which witnessed a surge in retaliatory attacks and warning statements, indications of Saudi disengagement from the war in Yemen appeared more serious. A relative change was observed in the KSA’s traditional discourse compared to its previously confrontational tone. For over seven years, the KSA had been emphasizing its air defense capabilities and readiness to counter any threats, while downplaying the significance of the Ansar Allah Group rockets and drones, often referring to them as mere “fireworks.”
This was manifested in the announcement of a humanitarian ceasefire that came into effect in early April 2022 and officially ended at the beginning of October 2022. However, military confrontations between the Saudi-led Arab coalition and the Ansar Allah Group came to a complete halt until now, and the intensity of clashes within Yemen’s geography significantly diminished. The US administration remained supportive and encouraging of the path towards ending the war until October 2023.
Consequently, we can infer that the KSA acquiesced to certain military and security conditions set by the Ansar Allah Group under specific circumstances. The KSA felt that it was left without aerial cover to protect it from the Ansar Allah Group’s attacks. According to an analysis by Kamran Bokhari, an expert in national security and foreign policy at the New Lines Institute in Washington, published on the Geopolitical Futures website, Riyadh is constrained by two critical factors that will arrest its ability to shape its strategic environment in the foreseeable future. The first factor is its heavy reliance on other countries to achieve its national security objectives and foreign policy goals. The second factor is Iran, its geopolitical rival, which possesses much greater tools at its disposal and is determined to thwart the KSA’s plans in the Middle East. In other words, the KSA was seeking to fill the gaps that could pose a threat to its national security and worked towards easing its crises with Iran and the Ansar Allah Group.
Normalization Deal: The Potential Alternative to Fill the Security Gap
Since mid-2023, there has been much talk about an American endeavor to reach a comprehensive deal between the KSA, the US, and Israel. This deal has the potential to redraw the geopolitical map of the Middle East and create a significant shift in countering Iran’s influence and the entities aligned with it in the region, including the Ansar Allah Group. According to rumors circulating in American circles, the proposed security agreement includes arming the KSA with advanced weapons and guarantees of defense for the KSA in exchange for its normalization with Israel, a halt to Chinese arms purchases, and restrictions or limitations on Chinese investments in the KSA.
Considering the security dimension as a priority for the KSA, providing these guarantees would alleviate Saudi concerns and enable it to overcome the security challenges posed by Iran and the Ansar Allah Group. Simultaneously, it would serve as an outlet to alleviate pressure from the Ansar Allah Group, which demands the prompt signing of the agreement by KSA as a primary party in the war, not as a mediator. In other words, if concluded, this deal would meet KSA’s defense needs by lifting restrictions on the sale of advanced American weaponry. The American defense commitment would shield the Kingdom from the Ansar Allah Group attacks, ultimately bolstering its position in the Yemeni file with a stronger military and negotiating stance.
Undoubtedly, the Ansar Allah Group realizes that the US is courting the KSA to finalize the normalization deal. They may have doubts that the KSA might agree to sign the deal before agreeing to a ceasefire agreement, causing the Ansar Allah Group to lose the gains it has achieved so far. This seems to be what is pushing the Ansar Allah Group to appear more urgent and in need of advancing the negotiations and breaking the stalemate it has been experiencing for about ten months, unless – according to its leaders’ statements – it will not remain idle, hinting at a resumption of its attacks against the KSA.
On the other hand, the US recognizes the Ansar Allah Group’s concerns about the normalization deal between the KSA and Israel, which urges the US to pressure the KSA to slow down in signing the ceasefire agreement with the Ansar Allah Group. If this deal is concluded before signing the agreement to end the war between the KSA and the Ansar Allah Group, it will create additional complications for the Yemeni file, making it more difficult to reach a peace agreement.
Finally, during this period, the Ansar Allah Group is facing immense economic pressures, represented by the decision to transfer banks and the transfer of revenues from Yemeni airlines and the telecommunications sector to the CBY in Aden. All of this will ultimately undermine the prospects for peace, as the Ansar Allah Group accuses the US and KSA of being behind all these developments. According to the leader of the group, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, in a televised speech last Thursday, he described it as “adding fuel to the fire.” He added that the pressure on banks in Sana’a is an American attempt to support the Israeli enemy, indicating that these decisions are a reaction to the Red Sea attacks.
Similarly, Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Ansar Allah Group’s Political Bureau, stated in a post on X: “Despite the KSA’s procrastination in fully implementing the agreement provisions related to lifting the blockade, paying salaries, releasing prisoners, and withdrawing its forces from Yemen, we have not resorted to escalation since the end of the ceasefire.” He further stated, “the KSA’s resort to escalation while we are in a direct war with the US for the sake of Palestine will cost it a lot.”
Based on all of the above, the current situation in Yemen is worrisome, and its future is unclear. The peace process in Yemen is contingent on various dynamics, including the developments in the Gaza conflict, the normalization deal between the KSA and Israel, and the American and Saudi visions of the conflict’s developments. In short, the scene appears bleak and closer to war than to peace.
***
