The Russian Strategy in the Yemen Crisis: Is its Neutrality at Stake?
Executive Summary
The Russian Federation maintains significant economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two countries supporting the internationally recognized Yemeni government (IRG) and the anti-Ansar Allah camp (the Houthis). Similarly, Russia has a strategic relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, in turn, has close strategic ties with the Ansar Allah group. Due to these intertwined relationships and interests, Russia has positioned itself equidistantly from all parties involved in the ongoing conflict in Yemen since 2015. This appears to be an ideal position for Russia to play a constructive role in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table and achieving a comprehensive political settlement in Yemen. However, further western military support to Ukraine, Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied weapons for strikes on military targets on Russian territory, and further escalation between Israel and the Axis of Resistance may push Russia to abandon its neutral stance in the region and align with the Ansar Allah group in a manner that does not affect its positive image in the Yemeni crisis.
Introduction
Russia’s relationship with Yemen in its northern and southern regions dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) supported the then Arab Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) during its establishment in the early 1960s and throughout the 70-day siege, setting up an airlift to supply revolutionists with ammunition and weapons. Russia also constructed the first hospital shortly after the establishment of the republic.
As for its relationship with the former Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), their relationship occupied an advanced position, as the latter remained the strongest ally of the “Soviet Union” during the 1970s and 1980s, enabling the construction of the largest military bases in the Arab region, especially in the provinces of Aden, Lahij, and Socotra. However, when the Soviet Union dissolved in the late 1980s, Moscow ceased its support for “South Yemen,” abandoned its military bases, and lost its geopolitical influence in Yemen and in the Arab region as a whole. Yet, this was short-lived as Russia regained its economic and military strength, emerging as a great power striving to reclaim its glory and play a more assertive and influential role in global politics beyond its geographical borders.
As part of this expansion, Russia rekindled its relationship with the Republic of Yemen, born in 1990 after the unification between “North Yemen” and “South Yemen,” regaining some of its military and geopolitical influence over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It maintained a strong diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with the Republic of Yemen under the rule of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Unlike other countries that withdrew their diplomatic and consular missions from Sana’a in 2014 and 2015 due to the deteriorating security, military, and political situation in Yemen, Russia kept its embassy open in Sana’a until the killing of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017, following armed clashes with the Ansar Allah group.
Since the beginning of the conflict ten years ago Russia has consistently emphasized the futility of a military solution to end the conflict in Yemen, seizing every opportunity to underscore the importance of reaching a political and peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen. It expressed support for the recent Saudi rapprochement with the Ansar Allah group, known for the roadmap that was expected to be signed by the end of 2023 but was frozen due to military developments in the region.
Generally, the Russian approach towards the conflict in Yemen has been characterized by its openness to all actors in the Yemeni crisis, seemingly standing to a relatively equal extent with all parties to the conflict: Iran-backed Ansar Allah group, Saudi-backed IRG, UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), and UAE-backed Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR). However, to preserve its strategic interests, especially in the context of Western military aid to Ukraine, Russia may abandon its equidistance strategy and could find itself one of the parties to the conflict.
This brief paper seeks to shed light on the Russian role in the current Yemeni crisis and the expected scenarios during the upcoming period.
The Russian Approach with the Conflicting Parties:
Russia’s Relationship with the IRG
Moscow officially recognized the legitimacy of former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi since his election in 2012 until his resignation in 2022, when he was replaced by the Presidential Leadership Council, led by Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, and the membership of seven members, including Brigadier Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, President of the Aden-based STC, and Brigadier Tariq Saleh, head of Al-Makha-based PBNR. Russia welcomed the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council, expressing hope that the council would do everything in its power to bring about peace and “restore this historically friendly country to peaceful life,” according to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During both Hadi’s and Alimi’s tenure, many officials of the Yemeni government visited Moscow, indicating the depth of the relationship. Russia was the first foreign visit for Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak (February 27, 2024) upon his appointment (February 5, 2024), during which they activated the Joint Yemeni-Russian Committee. This was followed by a visit from Yemeni Foreign Minister, Shai’a Al-Zindani, at the end of last August. Seemingly, the most prominent result of these visits was the reopening of the Russian embassy in the temporary capital, Aden, making Russia the first country to reopen its embassy in Yemen.
Despite this presumably strong and evolving relationship, the IRG is likely concerned about the strategic ties between Moscow and Tehran as this will potentially strengthening the Ansar Allah group and widening the balance of power between the group and the IRG. To put it differently, Moscow-Tehran close ties may lead- directly or indirectly- to strengthening Ansar Allah militarily and politically at the cost of the IRG, given that Russia is one of the world’s leading producers of advanced weapons and a permanent member of the Security Council. This point will be further explained in the following paragraphs.
Russia’s Relationship with the Ansar Allah Group
Since coming to power in 2014, the Ansar Allah group has sought to persuade Russia to establish diplomatic and perhaps military relations. However, such relations wouldn’t have been in line with Russia’s economic and geopolitical interests with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, due to their hostility towards the policies of the United States in the region, Russia has shown some sympathy towards them on several occasions. In April 2015, Russia was the only member of the UN Security Council to abstain from voting on Resolution 2216, which imposed an arms embargo on the Ansar Allah group and called for the reinstatement of former President Hadi in Sana’a. In February 2018, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution to extend the arms embargo on the Ansar Allah group. Moscow also opposed the US administration’s designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organization and instead called for a comprehensive peace process in Yemen.
Recently, Amidst the developments of the Israeli war on Gaza and Ansar Allah group’s attacks on Israeli-affiliated ships, followed by American and British attacks on Ansar Allah group’s targets in Yemen, Moscow expressed its condemnation through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, stating, “Russia unequivocally condemns the aggression of Western countries on Yemen without any repercussions from the UN Security Council.” That is, Russian diplomacy condemns the US and Britain for unauthorized attacks on the Ansar Allah group, considering it an illegal use of force.
This relationship was reflected in the visits made by the Ansar Allah representative to Moscow. On August 10, 2022, a delegation from the Ansar Allah group, headed by Mohammad Abdulsalam, made “a high-level visit to Moscow” . According to Abdulsalam, “there are changes in the Russian position towards Yemen, as it realized that Yemen can be a strategic influence.” He stressed that “as long as the US-Saudi aggression and siege continue, Yemenis have the right to meet and unite with all those impacted by the American agenda, including Russia. He pointed out that there are new challenges that Yemen shares with Russia, Iran, the countries of the Axis of Resistance and other countries affected by American hegemony”.
Amid ongoing regional developments, particularly the Israeli war on Gaza, diplomatic talks between Russia and the Ansar Allah group continue. In the context of the situation in Gaza and the escalation in the Red Sea, Abdulsalam visited Moscow in January 2024, stating on his “X” platform account: “Today, in Moscow, we met with the Special Representative of the Russian President for Middle East and Africa Affairs, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, where the situation in the region was discussed, especially the ongoing genocide crimes in Gaza…The latest developments in negotiations and discussions with Saudi Arabia through the mediation of the brotherly Sultanate of Oman regarding the developments in the Yemeni political process were also reviewed.” At this point, it’s worth noting that Moscow has consistently emphasized that dialogue, especially between Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government on one side, and Tehran and the Ansar Allah group on the other, remains essential to achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Yemen. In this context, in early 2022, Moscow announced its intention to hold an Iranian-Arab conference focusing on the most urgent regional issues, including the Yemeni crisis.
Russia’s Relationship with Iran
Russia enjoys close ties with Iran. Amid the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that erupted on February 24, 2022, Moscow and Tehran are working to strengthen their military relations. Reports have circulated suggesting that Tehran is providing military support to Moscow. In return, the West is supplying Kyiv with strategic weapons, including “Storm Shadow” missiles with a range of 250 to 400 kilometers. Some Western countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany, and France have stated that Ukraine has the right to use the weapons provided to strike targets in Russia.
In this context, as a response from Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned at the beginning of last June that if Ukraine were given the green light by Western countries to use its weapons to target Russian territory, Russia might have to respond in kind. He said, “If anyone thinks that similar weapons can be deployed in the battle zone to strike our territory, why shouldn’t we have the right to send our weapons of the same kind to areas in the world where attacks are directed against Russia-sensitive facilities?” This statement seems to have sparked speculation among many American politicians and some media outlets that Moscow has indeed begun supplying Tehran- Washington’s archenemy- with advanced weapons for distribution to the resistance axis currently facing Tel Aviv, Washington’s strongest ally in the Arab region.
The Wall Street Journal warned of the possibility of Russia arming the Yemeni Ansar Allah group with advanced anti-ship missiles in response to Washington’s support for Ukraine. One of the motivations prompting Moscow to arm the Ansar Allah group is the possibility that Western countries may decide to allow Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike targets deep within Russia. In this context, according to Reuters (September 24, 2024), Iran is mediating secret ongoing talks between Russia and the Ansar Allah group to transfer advanced missiles to them. In this same context, Tim Lenderking stated that he had seen “extremely disturbing evidence” that Russia is seeking to arm the Ansar Allah group. Speaking on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 24, 2024, he warned in a statement to Agence France-Presse that Moscow is “making its own deals” with the Ansar Allah group to allow its ships to pass without harm. Lenderking added, “We have confirmation that the Russians and the Ansar Allah group are exploring ways to cooperate,” including the transfer of weapons. He continued, “We do not know if weapon transfers are occurring as we speak, but the situation has reached a point where we all need to sound the alarm to ensure that it does not happen.” Lenderking emphasized that if weapon transfers were facilitated, “it could significantly alter the conflict,” warning of “escalation” that could derail current efforts to end the decade-long conflict in Yemen from its course.
While Moscow and Tehran have not responded to these statements with confirmation or denial, the official spokesman for the Ansar Allah group, Mohammed Abdulsalam, told Reuters, ” We have no knowledge of what you have said.”
Russia’s Relationship with the Southern Transitional Council
As previously mentioned, Moscow deals with Yemeni parties from a somewhat equal distance, and its handling of the STC is no exception. However, it appears that Moscow interacts with them in a friendly manner, granting them some international legitimacy. This is evident through the official invitations received by the STC to visit Moscow, as well as visits by Russian officials to the STC at its main headquarters in the interim capital, Aden. Visits by the STC’s President, Major General Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, to the capital Moscow have been recurring, with the latest in March 2023, possibly in his capacity as a member of the Presidential Council. These visits were preceded by two earlier ones in March 2019 and January 2021, all of which were invitations extended by the Russian Foreign Ministry in his capacity as the leader of the Southern Transitional Council.
In return, the STC invited the former Russian ambassador, Vladimir Dedushkin, to visit its headquarters in the interim capital, Aden, in March 2019. He was received by the STC leadership at Aden Airport with separatist ceremonies and flags. The red carpet was rolled out for him, and a STC- affiliated armed band played the national anthem of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which unified with the Yemen Arab Republic in 1990 to form what is known today as the Republic of Yemen. Earlier, the same ambassador had stated in 2019 that “South Yemen is an important region in the country that must be represented as it should in a potential peaceful settlement.” This emphasis on the importance of resolving the “southern issue” in Yemen as an essential part of ending the civil war in the country is the same emphasis that Russian President Vladimir Putin has often reiterated in many of his meetings.
Similarly, in last February, the President of the General Administration of Foreign Affairs of the STC received the Ambassador, Alexander Kinschak, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, and his accompanying delegation at Aden International Airport.
It is unlikely that Russia supports the secession of the south, at least under the current circumstances, but its interest in southern Yemen may reflect its historical ties and, more importantly, its geopolitical interests and aspirations to expand its influence in the Middle East by extending its sphere of influence in the Red Sea region. That is to say, despite its close ties with the STC, Russia has always stressed its support for Yemeni unity and its recognition of the legitimacy of a single Yemeni government, the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government.
Russia’s Relationship with the National Resistance
The leader of the National Resistance Political Bureau (NRPB), Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, aspires to establish a strong relationship with Moscow, similar to that linked his late uncle, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to Moscow. As his first foreign visit since the killing of his uncle Saleh in December 2017, Moscow was Tariq’s first stop.
The reasons for this visit were not disclosed, but it coincided with an active period in Russian diplomacy. Days prior, the IRG Yemeni Foreign Minister, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, visited Russia, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, as part of governmental efforts to establish a “greater Russian role” in creating a channel of influence on the Ansar Allah group to accept growing international peace initiatives. This visit also followed days after a visit by the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, to Moscow.
On the 18th of the current September, Presidential Council member, Tareq Saleh, arrived in the Russian capital, Moscow, where he met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who reaffirmed Moscow’s support for the legitimate leadership in Yemen and peace efforts led by the United Nations, highlighting Russia’s decision to reopen its embassy in Aden to enhance communication and coordination with the Yemeni government. According to reports from the official “SABA” agency, Colonel Tareq discussed with the Russian Foreign Minister the need for collective international efforts to advance peace initiatives in Yemen, involving all parties under the auspices of the UN, as well as regional stability and maritime security, particularly in the Red Sea, stressing the importance of unified international action to achieve these goals.
Russia-Saudi Arabia Relationship
Since the early 1990s, Russia has sought to strengthen its relationship with Saudi Arabia for economic and geopolitical reasons. Being significant members of the OPEC oil organization has led to the enhancement of economic ties between them. However, Russia has consistently criticized Saudi intervention in Yemen, despite overlooking the passing of Resolution 2215, which legitimized Saudi Arabia and the coalition’s involvement in Yemeni affairs. These criticisms of Saudi Arabia seem to be in response to Saudi criticisms of Moscow’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its relationship with Iran and the Ansar Allah group.
Recent reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has requested Russia’s mediation to settle the ongoing proxy conflict in Yemen between the Kingdom and Iran. The intelligence-focused website revealed that senior officials from the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency recently held a series of meetings with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to exchange intelligence on arms supplies to the Ansar Allah group. Riyadh hopes that Moscow will play a more substantial role in negotiations to end the conflict in Yemen. According to the French intelligence-focused website Intelligence Online on March 31, 2023, intelligence sources revealed that senior officials from the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency recently held a series of meetings with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to exchange intelligence on arms supplies to the Ansar Allah group. Riyadh is hopeful that Moscow will play a more robust role in negotiations to end the conflict in Yemen. The sources also mentioned that Mohammed Al-Nuamani, head of the Omani Sultan’s office, is also involved in mediation efforts for a settlement in Yemen and discussed details with the Russian Ambassador in Muscat, Ilya Morgunov.
Russia-UAE Relationship
Russian-UAE relations have notably evolved in recent times, prominently demonstrated through the numerous visits made by Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, to Moscow. The declaration of a strategic partnership between the two countries in 2018 further solidified this relationship. The UAE has resumed its diplomatic ties with the Assad regime, supported by Russia, which in turn has backed Khalifa Haftar, an ally of the UAE in Libya. This alignment in perspectives between the two nations suggests a mutual understanding.
Based on this alignment, it is expected that Moscow will continue to support the UAE’s allies in Yemen, such as the STC and NRPB. This would be like killing three birds with one stone: it would be in line with the UAE’s vision to support its allies, it would consolidate STC and NRPB’s power, politically and militarily, and it would ultimately serve Russian geopolitical interests, especially since both parties overlook the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Scenarios
It is evident from the aforementioned that Russia maintains close ties with all local and regional parties to the conflict. Even if it appears more aligned with one party over another, this does not imply that Russia will throw its diplomatic weight behind that party. In other words, being a major power with its own economic, security, and military interests, Russia cannot compromise these to appease one party or another, especially considering the unclear political landscape in Yemen and the unpredictable nature of the region’s dramatically changing circumstances. Therefore, based on these factors, the following scenarios are expected:
Scenario 1: Open Doors for All (Strategic Neutrality)
In its pursuit to regain political and military influence and assert itself as an international player, Russia may maintain its strategic balance among conflicting parties. Collaborating with the UN envoy and influential regional powers, Russia may aim to broker a political agreement for power-sharing among all conflicting factions to varying degrees. However, if this is not achieved soon, which is very probable, regional and international situations may evolve, potentially leading Moscow to abandon the principle of “strategic neutrality,” given its conflicts with major Western powers. Then, it may be in Russia’s interest to align with the Ansar Allah group.
Scenario 2: strategic alignment with Ansar Allah
The Ansar Allah’s rising popularity, locally and regionally, may attract Moscow to overturn the political and military hegemony practiced by the United States and its allies. Put it differently, Ansar Allah and Moscow share a common goal (weakening US political and military domination) and thus they should perform a collective action. Russia views Ansar Allah as a useful instrument for harming the interests of the United States and its European allies in the Red sea, but the group may need developed weapons, which Russia has.
This scenario remains subject to the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections in November. It is expected to have a significant and potentially decisive impact on the course of the war between Russia and Ukraine. The policies of the leading candidates regarding military aid to Ukraine appear starkly different. A victory for former President Donald Trump is likely to result in reduced US commitment to supplying Ukraine with arms and financial support, potentially preventing them from using American weapons to attack Russian territories, which would benefit Russia. Conversely, if Vice President Kamala Harris wins, continued American support for Ukraine is expected to prolong the war, potentially giving Kyiv further incentive to use American weaponry against Moscow.
In the event of a Trump victory, Russia may pressure its ally Iran to leverage its strategic relationship with the Ansar Allah group to push for concessions towards a political settlement in Yemen. Should Harris win, Kyiv might resort to American arms to strike targets within Russia. If this happens, then Russia mat resort to provide Ansar Allah with the weapons they need. However, in case this scenario comes true, it is expected that Russia will provide the group with weapons in the form of precision anti-ship missiles or long-range missiles, and thus this will not affect the balance of power between the Ansar Allah group and the parties opposing it. By doing so, Russia may seem maintaining its neutral image in the Yemeni conflict. However, if the military situation escalates, whether on the Russian-Ukrainian or Israeli-Resistance axis fronts, Russia may find itself deeply involved in the Yemeni conflict.
Scenario 3: Exerting Pressure on the Southern Transitional Council
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aims to exit Yemen as soon as possible. The STC remains a prominent challenge to this exit, as it insists on settling the southern situation before agreeing to any resolution. Riyadh may request Moscow to exert pressure on the Transitional Council to accept a political settlement, while providing assurances of addressing the southern issue post-exit.
